Showing posts with label theology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theology. Show all posts

Thursday, August 15, 2013

The Assumption & Unity of Knowledge

KNOLLER, Martin
Assumption of the Virgin
c. 1774
Oil on canvas, 220 x 82 cm
Musée du Louvre, Paris


The definition of the Dogma of the Bodily Assumption into Heaven of Our Blessed Mother was given on All Saints Day, November, 1950, just a few months after the promulgation of Humani Generis on August 12, 1950. Pope Pius XII writes in Munificentissimus Deus: "Now, just like the present age, our pontificate is weighed down by ever so many cares, anxieties, and troubles, by reason of very severe calamities that have taken place [such as WWII] and by reason of the fact that many have strayed away from truth and virtue." What is underlined is certainly Humani Generis's concern, too.

Intellectuals like the great Canadian philosopher of science Charles de Koninck, who wrote the excellent philosophico-theological short work "Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom that is Mary," noted that the bodily Assumption reaffirms the unity of man (contra, e.g., Cartesian dualism, which splits body and soul) and thus also the unity of knowledge (as Our Lady is the highest form of knowledge: Wisdom Herself).

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Monday, October 31, 2011

Newton the First Modernist?

Newton wrote at least as much theology as he did physics and mathematics, yet he believed in the Arian heresy that Jesus Christ is not truly divine. Newton also had a great contempt for the 13th century scholastic St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. his entry in the Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography). But why? St. Thomas was crucial in advancing science and paving the way for the discoveries of Galileo et al.

Newton does not refute St. Thomas on his own grounds; he just says in "Two Notable Corruptions of Scripture (part 1: ff. 1-41):"
[...] but to us Thomas Aquinas is no Apostle; we are seeking for the authority of greek manuscripts.
(Cf. Fr. Ramírez, O.P.'s The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas.) This "ressourcement" or "going back to the [supposedly] more authoritative sources" is what Modernist theologians say today. Modernism is detrimental to the advancement of science. In Standing on the Sholders of Giants, David Boyd Haycock writes (my emphasis and [comments]):
If Baconianism, Newtonianism and the Royal Society were three of the most significant influences upon the development of science in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England, then a fourth requiring full and equal consideration is religion. As we have seen, Baconian scientific methodology advocated a split from the earlier, uncritical Aristotelianism of the scholastics. However, in the Middle Ages Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology had become thoroughly assimilated through the apologetics [He did pure philosophy and theology, too.] of the medieval scholar Thomas Aquinas, so that at least one cautious seventeenth-century religious commentator, writing as 'S. P.' (possibly Simon Patrick, later the bishop of Ely), feared that since 'philosophy and divinity [i.e., theology] are so interwoven by the schoolmen ... it cannot be safe to separate them; new philosophy will bring in new divinity.' [Yes, St. Thomas's doctrine on faith and reason will never be superseded.] It was this very fear which had led the Catholic Church to its persecution of both the former Dominican friar and philosopher Giordano Bruno [Suspected of the Arian heresy, he was a pantheist and materialist who said "Matter is not without its forms, but contains them all; and since it carries what is wrapped up in itself, it is in truth all nature and the mother of all the living." (C. Gutberlet).] (who was burnt at the stake [by civil authorities, not clerics] in 1600), and the Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei. Though English Protestants considered themselves well above such Papist extremes, Newton's critic Dr Edwards castigated his contemporaries for their practice of 'coining ... New Systems in Divinity.' He observed how 'this vain Apprehension [Yes, it certainly is vain. What is their justification of it?] possesses them, that, because in this Learned Age some parts of Humane Knowledge are censur'd [Such as?], and the very Principles of some Arts, especially those that relate to Natural Philosophy, have undergone a great Alteration [But not so great that, e.g., quidquid movetur ab alio movetur ("that which is moved is moved by another") is no longer true.]; therefore they may venture to advance some unheard-of doctrines in Divinity, to new model our Religion, to mend the Gospel, and to present us as it were with a New Christianity'. [So basically they changed "Divinity" in order to advance their supposedly greatly altered "Natural Philosophy," based on which they would try to justify the "New Christianity"?] Bacon had attempted to defend his new method from any such criticism by arguing that 'we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God.' [Cf. Romans 1:20: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity."] But it was impossible that a science based upon the empirical study of a world considered to be divine handiwork would not inevitably lead to questions relating to the very nature of the divine itself. [This is why by their very nature "philosophy and divinity are so interwoven," so, with Dr. Edwards, I reiterate: "Why the need for a 'new philosophy' and 'new divinity'?"]
"Do not block the way of inquiry!", C. S. Peirce would say.

Sunday, April 3, 2011

Hume vs. Aquinas on Transubstantiation

Benedict Ashley, O.P., in his book The Way toward Wisdom (p. 511 n. 53), cites Hume's claim, which he borrowed from Dr. Tillotson, that the transubstantiation, "since it denies the evidence of the senses on which all certitude rests," "leads to skepticism:"

I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.

[...]

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains.

—David Hume's Enquiry of Human Understanding, sec. 10 "On Miracles" part 1

Benedict Ashley, O.P., responds:
Yet we experience that very unusual events do in fact occur! Why must we, then, always doubt the testimony of others about such events? Sense experiences are signs to be intellectually interpreted always in their contexts. The proper accidents of bread and wine naturally signify these substances, but for the Catholic faith the context of the Eucharist established by God permits the appearance of bread and wine to signify without deception [Summa Theologiæ, IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2 et ad 2] Christ's body and blood. Although this is not strictly a "miracle" (since the change is not evident to our senses and hence is extremely improbable as regard natural reason), as Aquinas shows [Summa Theologiæ, IIIª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3 et ad 3], it is not impossible; and if the Catholic faith is credible, as apologetic seeks to show, reason demands that it be believed on the testimony of the Church. Similarly, the context of the Bible as read in the tradition of the Church (which one would suppose Tillotson accepted) permits it to signify the mind of God, not merely the intent of its human authors. Hume's argument amount to declaring that he is determined to interpret his experiences a way that will not disturb his "common sense" habits; but life is full of uncomfortable events.
The above-mentioned St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiæ quotes are:

Objection 2. Further, there ought not to be any deception in a sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems, then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain, the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to this sacrament.

Objection 3. Further, although our faith is not subject to reason, still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the beginning of this work (Summa Theologiæ, Iª q. 1 a. 6 ad 2 et a. 8). But our reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.

[...]

Reply to Objection 2 and 3. There is no deception in this sacrament; for the accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii, is preserved by faith from deception. And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not reach.

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

St. Albertus Magnus's Commentary on Euclid's Elements

St. Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) wrote extensively on physics methodology, among other fields like theology and the experimental sciences, and is credited for discovering arsenic. He said: "The aim of natural science is not simply to accept the statements [narrata] of others, but to investigate the causes that are at work in nature" (De Miner., lib. II, tr. ii, i) and "Experimentum solum certificat in talibus" ("Experiment is the only safe guide in such investigations;" De Veg., VI, tr. ii, i). Against what today one would call "intelligent design," St. Albert says: "In studying nature we have not to inquire how God the Creator may, as He freely wills, use His creatures to work miracles and thereby show forth His power: we have rather to inquire what Nature with its immanent causes can naturally bring to pass" (De Coelo et Mundo, I, tr. iv, x).
     The Dominican Scholastic philosopher Albertus Magnus (1193?-1280) acquired the title Doctor Universalis from the breadth of his learning, which astonished his contemporaries. His fame earned him a place in the Divine Comedy, where his most famous student, Thomas Aquinas, introduces him to Dante:
Questi che m'è a destra più vicino
Frate e maëstro fummi, ed esso Alberto
È di Cologna, e io Thomas d'Aquino. (Paradiso, X, 97-99)

He who is nearest to me on the right
Was my colleague and teacher, namely, Albert
Of Cologne, and I am Thomas Aquinas.
The program of the scholastic philosophers was to use the deductive method of mathematics to demonstrate by reason the existence of Deity and to describe His attributes, to prove the immortality of the soul, to assert free will, and in general to establish thereby the truth of the Catholic religion. Their first axiom was, that this was possible. Even Russell, who considered theology nothing more than organized ignorance, could nevertheless respect the Medieval mastery of logic:
     The medieval outlook of educated men had a logical unity which has now been lost. We may take Thomas Aquinas as the authoritative exponent of the creed which science was compelled to attack. He maintained—and his view is still that of the Roman Catholic Church—that some of the fundamental truths of the Christian religion could be proved by the unaided reason, without the help of revelation. Among these was the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent Creator. From His omnipotence and benevolence followed that He would not leave His creatures without knowledge of His decrees, to the extent that might be necessary to obey His will. There must therefore be a Divine revelation, which, obviously, is contained in the Bible and the decisions of the Church. This point being established, the rest of what we need to know can be inferred from the Scriptures and the pronouncements of oecumenical Councils. The whole argument proceeds deductively from premisses formerly accepted by almost the whole population of Christian countries, and if the argument is, to the modern reader, at times faulty, its fallacies were not apparent to the majority of learned contemporaries.
     Now logical unity is at once a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it insures that whoever accepts one stage of the argument must accept all later stages; it is a weakness because whoever rejects any of the later stages must also reject some, at least, of the earlier stages. The Church, in its conflict with science, exhibited both the strength and the weakness resulting from the logical coherence of its dogmas [Religion and Science, 12-13].
Within this program, it was the special enterprise of Albertus Magnus to interpret the works of Aristotle for his Medieval contemporaries, insofar as the writings of that philosopher could be known through the veil of Latin translations of Arabic translations of the Greek texts, which at that time covered the hearts of the learned. In so doing, he made a major contribution to culture, for Aristotle was interested in the natural world, and investigation into his activities tended to promote the rebirth of knowledge, which was accomplished in the period called the Renaissance. The labors of pople like Albertus Magnus were appreciated by Macaulay, who noticed them in one of the most famous chapters in literature:
     Whatever reproach may, at a later period, have been justly thrown on the indolence and lukury of religios orders, it was surely good that, in an age of ignorance and violence, there should be quiet cloisters and gardens, in which the arts of peace could be safely cultivated, in which gentle and contemplative natures could find an asylum, in which one brother could employ himself in transcribing the Aeneid of Virgil, and another in meditating the Analytics of Aristotle, in which he who had a genius for art might illuminate a martyrology or carve a crucifix, and in which he who had a turn for natural philosophy might make experiments on the properties of plants and minerals [The History of English from the Accession of James II, I, 9]
     Albertus Magnus is one of those personalities who are appreciated even by those whith a critical attitude towarsd the Catholic religion. For example, White, cofounder and first president of Cornell University, a declared enemy of dogmatic theology, had a sympathetic opinion of him:
First among these was Albert of Bollstädt, better known as Albert the Great, the most renowned scholar of his time. Fettered though he was by the methods sanctioned in the Church, dark as was all about him, he had conceived better methods and aims; his eye pierced the mists of scholasticism; he saw the light, and sought to draw the world toward it. He stands among the great pioneers of physical and natural science; he aided in giving foundations to botany and chemistry, he rose above his time, and struck a heavy blow on those who opposed the possibility of human life on the opposite sides of the earth; he noted the influence of mountains, seas, and forests upon races and products, so that Humboldt justly finds in his works the germs of physical geography as a comprehensive science [A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, I, 377].
The most recent biography of Albert, written on the occasion of the seven hundredth anniversary of his death, is by Weisheipl ["The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great". Albertus Magnus and the Sciences — Commemorative Essays].
     Albertus Magnus conceived and carried out the plan of commenting on all human knowledge by beginning with the natural sciences, proceeding to mathematics, and finishing in philosophy and theology. Thus, in his writings in the natural sciences, he refers to mathematics as the object of future activity:
     Primo complebimus, Deo adiuvante, scientiam naturalem, et deinde loquemur de mathematicis omnibus, et intentionem finiemus in scientia divina (Physica, Book I, Treatise 1, Chapter i).
     With God's help, we shall first complete natural science, and then we shall talk about all of mathematics, and we shall finish our program in divine science.

     Longum esset demonstrare, sed in geometria hoc docebitur et in astronomia, Domino concedente (Op. cit., I, 2, i).
     It would be long to prove, but, God willing, this will be taught in geometry and astronomy.

     Haec autem omnia supponenda sunt, probanda autem in libris de visu in Perspectivis, quae scientia compleri non potest, nisi primum consideremus ea quae pertinent ad geometriam (De Sensu et Sensato, Treatise 1, Chapter 14).
     All these things, however, must be supposed for now; they are to be proven, though, in the books on sight in Perspective, which science cannot be completed unless we shall first consider those things that pertain to geometry.
In his compositions on philosophy and theology, however, Albert refers to his work on geometry as at hing of the past, for he accepted the idea of Plato, that one could not competently study philosophy without having first mastered mathematics.
     Naturalibus et doctrinalibus iam, quantum licuit, scientiis elucidatis, iam ad veram philosophiae sapientiam accedamus (Metaphysica, Book I, Treatise I, Chapter i).
     Now that the natural and mathematical sciences have been elucidated as much as was possible, let us proceed to the true wisdom of philosophy.

     Hoc autem iam a nobis in geometricis est demonstratum (Ibid., I, 2, x).
     For this [sc. that the diameter and side of a square are incommensurable] has already been proven by us in the geometrical [works].

     Sicut in XV and XVI tertii geometriae nostrae demonstratum est (Ibid., III, 2, iii).
     Just as has been proven in the fifteenth and sixteenth [propositions] of the third [book] of our Geometry [sc. namely, that a tangent line to a circle intersects it at only one point].

     Sicut nos in I nostrae geometriae ostendimus (Ibid., V, 3, i).
     As we showed in the first [book] of our Geometry [sc., that two straight lines do not enclose a surface].

—Albertus Magnus on Euclid's Elements of Geometry, pgs. xi-xv

Here is St. Albertus Magnus's commentary on Euclid's famous proof of the Pythagorean Theorem, Proposition 46 here:

Friday, August 13, 2010

Interface between Theology and the Other Sciences

Related to this is again the question of why intellectual knowledge must come through the senses (Nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses: Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.). The faithful hold by faith that:
For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity.

—Romans 1:20

As well as these:
If anyone shall have said that the one true God, our Creator and our Lord, cannot be known with certitude by those things which have been made, by the natural light of human reason: let him be anathema

—Denzinger 1806

The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certitude by the natural light of human reason from created things; "for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" [Rom 1:20]; nevertheless, it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race in another and supernatural way, as the Apostle says: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days hath spoken to us by His Son" [Heb. 1:1].

—Denzinger 1785

Most relevant is this:
All knowledge of God, even natural knowledge, even in the pagan philosophers, cannot come except from God; and without grace knowledge produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and opposition to God Himself, instead of the affections of adoration, gratitude, and love.

—Denzinger 1391

How does the study of God's creatures, by doing physics in the broad sense of studying the natural world, lead to knowledge of Him? St. Thomas elucidates this:

Chapter 1

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS AND THE PRECEDING ONES

“I meditated upon Your works: I meditated upon the works of Your hands” (Ps. 142-5).

[1] Of no thing whatever can a perfect knowledge be obtained unless its operation is known, because the measure and quality of a thing’s power is judged from the manner and type of its operation, and its power, in turn, manifests its nature; for a thing’s natural aptitude for operation follows upon its actual possession of a certain kind of nature.

[2] There are, however, two sorts of operation, as Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics IX [8]: one that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of heating, cutting and building, for example.

[3] Now, both kinds of operation belong to God: the former, in that He understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that He brings things into being, preserves them, and governs them. But, since the former operation is a perfection of the operator, the latter a perfection of the thing made, and since the agent is naturally prior to the thing made and is the cause of it, it follows that the first of these types of operation is the ground of the second, and naturally precedes it, as a cause precedes its effect. Clear evidence of this fact, indeed, is found in human affairs; for in the thought and will of the craftsman lie the principle and plan of the work of building.

[4] Therefore, as a simple perfection of the operator, the first type of operation claims for itself the name of operation, or, again, of action; the second, as being a perfection of the thing made, is called making so that the things which a craftsman produces by action of this kind are said to be his handiwork.

[5] Of the first type of operation in God we have already spoken in the preceding Book of this work, where we treated of the divine knowledge and will. Hence, for a complete study of the divine truth, the second operation, whereby things are made and governed by God, remains to be dealt with.

[6], In fact, this order we can gather from the words quoted above. For the Psalmist first speaks of meditation upon the first type of operation, when he says: “I have meditated on all your operations”; thus, operation is here referred to the divine act of understanding and will. Then he refers to meditation on God’s works: “and I meditated on the works of Your hands”; so that by “the works of Your hands” we understand heaven and earth, and all that is brought into being by God, as the handiwork produced by a craftsman.

Chapter 2

THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR INSTRUCTION OF FAITH

[1] This sort of meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary for instruction of faith in God.

[2] First, because meditation on His works enables us in game measure to admire and reflect upon His wisdom. For things made by art are representative of the art itself, being made in likeness to the art. Now, God brought things into being by His wisdom; wherefore the Psalm (103:24) declares: “You made all things in wisdom.” Hence, from reflection upon God’s works we are able to infer His wisdom, since, by a certain communication of His likeness, it is spread abroad in the things He has made. For it is written: “He poured her out,” namely, wisdom, “upon all His works” (Eccli. 1:10). Therefore, the Psalmist, after saying: “Your knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, and I cannot reach it,” and after referring to the aid of the divine illumination, when he says: “Night shall be my light,” etc., confesses that he was aided in knowing the divine wisdom by reflection upon God’s works, saying: “Wonderful are Your works, and my soul knows right well” (Ps. 138:6, 11, 14).

[3] Secondly, this consideration [of God’s works] leads to admiration of God’s sublime power, and consequently inspires in men’s hearts reverence for God. For the power of the worker is necessarily understood to transcend the things made. And so it is said: “If they,” namely, the philosophers, “admired their power and effects,” namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, “let them understand that He that made them is mightier than they” (Wis. 13:4). Also it is written: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity” (Rom. 1:20). Now, the fear and reverence of God result from this admiration. Hence, it is said: “Great is Your name in might. Who shall not fear You, O King of Nations?” (Jer. l0:6-7).

[4] Thirdly, this consideration incites the souls of men to the love of God’s goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is distributed to the various creatures, in partial or particular measure, is united together in Him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in Book I. If, therefore, the goodness, beauty, and delightfulness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of God’s own goodness, compared with the rivulets of goodness found in creatures, will draw the enkindled minds of men wholly to Itself. Hence it is said in the Psalm (91:5): “You have given me, O Lord, a delight in Your doings, and in the works of Your hands I shall rejoice.” And elsewhere it is written concerning the children of men: “They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Your house,” that is, of all creatures, “and You shall make them drink of the torrent of Your pleasure: for with You is the fountain of life” (Ps. 35:9-10). And, against certain men, it is said: “By these good things that are seen,” namely, creatures, which are good by a kind of participation, “they could not understand Him that is” (Wis. 13:1), namely, truly good; indeed, is goodness itself, as was shown in Book I.

[5] Fourthly, this consideration endows men with a certain likeness to God’s perfection. For it was shown in Book I that, by knowing Himself, God beholds all other things in Himself. Since, then, the Christian faith teaches man principally about God, and makes him know creatures by the light of divine revelation, there arises in man a certain likeness of God’s wisdom. So it is said: “But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image” (2 Cor. 3:18).

[6] It is therefore evident that the consideration of creatures has its part to play in building the Christian faith. And for this reason it is said: “I will remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen: by the words of the Lord are His works” (Sirach 42:15).

Chapter 3

THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES SERVES TO DESTROY ERRORS CONCERNING GOD

[1] The consideration of creatures is further necessary, not only for the building up of truth, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, so far as the errors are inconsistent with true knowledge of God. Now, this happens in many ways.

[2] First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far perverted as to set up as. the first cause and as God that which can only receive its being from something else; for they think that nothing exists beyond the realm of visible creatures. Such were those who identified God with this, that, and the other kind of body; and of these it is said: “Who have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods” (Wis. 13: 2).

[3] Secondly, because they attribute to certain creatures that which belongs only to God. This also results from error concerning creatures. For what is incompatible with a thing’s nature is not ascribed to it except through ignorance of its nature—as if man were said to have three feet. Now, what belongs solely to God is incompatible with the nature of a created thing, just as that which is exclusively man’s is incompatible with another thing’s nature. Thus, it is from ignorance of the creature’s nature that the aforesaid error arises. And against this error it is said: “They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood” (Wis. 14:21). Into this error fell those who attribute the creation of things, or knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God.

[4] Thirdly, because through ignorance of the creature’s nature something is subtracted from God’s power in its working upon creatures. This is evidenced in the case of those who set up two principles of reality; in those who assert that things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural necessity; and again, in those who withdraw either all or some things from the divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these notions are derogatory to God’s power. Against such persons it is said: “Who looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing” (Job 22:17), and: “You show Your power, when men will not believe You to be absolute in power” (Wis. .12: 17).

[5] Fourthly, through ignorance of the nature of things, and, consequently, of his own place in the order of the universe, this rational creature, man, who by faith is led to God as his last end, believes that he is subject to other creatures to which he is in fact superior. Such is evidently the case with those who subject human wills to the stars, and against these it is said: “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear” (Jer. 10:2); and this is likewise true of those who think that angels are the creators of souls, that human souls are mortal, and, generally, of persons who hold any similar views derogatory to the dignity of man.

[6] It is, therefore, evident that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it made no difference to the truth of the faith what anyone holds about creatures, so long as one thinks rightly about God, as Augustine tells us in his book On the Origin of the Soul [De anima et ejus origine, IV, 4]. For error concerning creatures, by subjecting them to causes other than God, spills over into false opinion about God, and takes men’s minds away from Him, to whom faith seeks to lead them.

[7] For this reason Scripture threatens punishment to those who eff about creatures, as to unbelievers, in the words of the Psalm (27:5): “Because they have not understood the works of the Lord and the operations of His hands, You shall destroy them, and shall not build them up”; and: “These things they thought and were deceived,” and further on: “They did not esteem the honor of holy Souls” (Wis. 7:2122).

Chapter 4

THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN CONSIDER CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS

[1] Now, from what has been said it is evident that the teaching of the Christian faith deals with creatures so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and so far as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed in a different light by that doctrine and by human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as they are, so that the different parts of philosophy are found to correspond to the different genera of things. The Christian faith, however, does not consider them as such; thus, it regards fire not as fire, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way at all. For as it is said: “Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Did the Lord not make the saints declare all His wonderful works?” (Sirach 42: 16-17)

[2] For this reason, also, the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. The philosopher considers such things as belong to them by nature-the upward tendency of fire, for example; the believer, only such things as belong to them according as they are related to God—the fact, for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to Him, and so on.

[3] Hence, imperfection is not to be imputed to the teaching of the faith if it omits many properties of things, such as the figure of the heaven and the quality of its motion. For neither does the natural philosopher consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only those that accrue to it as terminus of a natural body.

[4] But any things concerning creatures that are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer are conveyed through different principles in each case. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, from the first cause—for such reasons as that a thing has been handed down in this manner by God, or that this conduces to God’s glory, or that God’s power is infinite. Hence, also, [the doctrine of the faith] ought to be called the highest wisdom, since it treats of the highest Cause; as we read in Deuteronomy (4:6): “For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.” And, therefore, human philosophy serves her as the first wisdom. Accordingly, divine wisdom sometimes argues from principles of human philosophy. For among philosophers, too, the first philosophy utilizes the teachings of all the sciences in order to realize its objectives.

[5] Hence again, the two kinds of teaching do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures; the last, of God. But in the teaching of faith, which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration of God comes first, that of creatures afterwards. And thus the doctrine of faith is more perfect, as being more like the knowledge possessed by God, who, in knowing Himself, immediately knows other things.

[6] And so, following this order, after what has been said in Book I about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which derive from Him.

—Contra Gentiles, lib. 2 cap. 1-4

Friday, July 16, 2010

Galileo's Giant: Nicole Oresme

Nicole Oresme (c. 1320 - 1382) argued, a couple hundred years before Galileo, that a rotating earth is a simpler explanation than that of Ptolemy. He invented the coordinate system long before Descartes (1596-1650). He also investigated fractional powers and determined that the distance a freely falling body travels (x) is proportional to the square of the time (t) it has been traveling, viz., x = ½ g t², where g is the acceleration due to gravity. He used a slightly different notation, however, beginning in his first page of Algorismus proportionum:

From the first page of Oresme's Algorismus proportionum (fourteenth century)

The original Latin
The original Latin

An English translation of the Latin
An English translation of the Latin

—Cajori's A History of Mathematical Notation, Vol. 1 pgs. 91-93

From the excellent introductory physics textbook Physics for Realists (available here) by the M.I.T. and Princeton physicist Dr. Anthony Rizzi, founder of the Institute for Advanced Physics:

Nicole Oresme (o'rem) was born c. 1320 AD in Normandy, France, and died in 1382. He was, among other things, a mathematician, a physicist and a priest (made bishop of liseaux, France, in 1377). His major mathematical work is "Tractatus de Difformitatum." Among his accomplishments are the use of rectangular coordinates and graphing of the intensity of a quality then called latitudo (say, temperature of a rod), against a length then called longitudo (e.g., distance along the same rod), on such a rectangular coordinate system. He also discovered that speed versus time graphs can be constructed. Further, he investigated, in his own notation, fractional powers, saying 43/2 = 8.

In dynamics, he shows, following Jean Buridan [...], that the movement of the Earth is consistent with immediate experience, though it does not seem so at first. And, he points out that the movement of the Earth, not the geocentric hyothesis, is, indeed, the simpler one. These arguments we be employed by his successors, including Copernicus and Galileo.

He also made an argument for an international dateline. His argument fundamentally rests on noticing that only the relative motion of the earth and sun defines a conventional day (i.e., based on the rising and setting of the sun for a given observer). The principle can be understood by noting that if one moved fast enough to say "under" the sun, one would never experience a single conventional day. The roundness of the earth, which is also needed in the argument, was commonly assumed in the Middle Ages.

He proved, using graphical methods, the mean speed theorem [...] which Galileo imported into his work without reference. He determined the distance = ½ acceleration time² law for uniformly accelerated motion that was later applied by Fr. Dominic De Soto (1494-1560 [...]) to free falling objects.

—PFR pg. 48

A page from Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1505)

—"Nicole Oresme" in the MacTutor History of Mathematics archive: A page from Oresme's Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1505 reprint)

Could not have Oresme, being a theologian, progressed science and mathematics more had he not seemingly wasted his time becoming a Master of Theology at the University of Paris? The answer is no. Fr. Benedict Ashley, O.P.—a key contributer and reviewer of Physics for Realists—explains that philosophy, which includes mathematics and science, is a handmaiden of theology:

—Benedict Ashley, O.P.

True philosophy, the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, supports true theology, both of which demand a pursuit of truth. Mentioning the horrible state of the philosophy that Pope Pius XII condemned in Humani Generis, "Nouvelle Théologie" (New Theology)—which is opposed to true, scientific theology and definitely merits the stereotypes of theology being an irrational, unscientific discipline, proceeding haphazardly from from shaky first-principles and jumping to non sequitur conclusions, ignoring that parvus error in principio magnus est in fine ("a small error in principle is a big error in conclusion"), and ultimately upholding the relativism of truth, that it is based on the changing state of man—the great 20th century Thomistic philosopher Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., wrote that
no new definition of truth is offered in the new definition of theology: “Theology is no more than a spirituality or religious experience which found its intellectual expression.” And so follow assertions such as: “If theology can help us to understand spirituality, spirituality will, in the best of cases, cause our theological categories to burst, and we shall be obliged to formulate different types of theology…For each great spirituality corresponded to a great theology.” Does this mean that two theologies can be true, even if their main theses are contradictory and opposite? The answer will be no if one keeps to the traditional definition of truth. The answer will be yes if one adopts the new definition of truth, conceived not in relation to being and to immutable laws, but relative to different religious experiences. These definitions seek only to reconcile us to modernism.

It should be remembered that on December 1, 1924, the Holy Office condemned 12 propositions taken from the philosophy of action, among which was number 5, or the new definition of truth: “Truth is not found in any particular act of the intellect wherein conformity with the object would be had, as the Scholastics say, but rather truth is always in a state of becoming, and consists in a progressive alignment of the understanding with life, indeed a certain perpetual process, by which the intellect strives to develop and explain that which experience presents or action requires: by which principle, moreover, as in all progression, nothing is ever determined or fixed.” The last of these condemned propositions is: “Even after Faith has been received, man ought not to rest in the dogmas of religion, and hold fast to them fixedly and immovably, but always solicitous to remain moving ahead toward a deeper truth and even evolving into new notions, and even correcting that which he believes.”

Many, who did not heed these warnings, have now reverted to these errors.

—“Where is the New Theology Leading Us?” by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

Oresme did not fall into these errors. He studied true theology because he did true science.

Saturday, April 10, 2010

Relation of truth, beauty, and reason

This is a disproof that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," which is really a statement of someone who denies objective truth, who upholds relativism. It shows the relation between truth, beauty, and reason.

Disproof

  • "Truth is the equation of thought and thing." (St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica Iª q. 16 a. 1 co.)
  • God is the equation* of thought, the divine intellect, and thing, His essence. 
  • "Beauty [...] consists in a certain clarity** and due proportion"† (ibid. IIª-IIae, q. 180 a. 2 ad 3).
  • God is "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe," being its creator. (ibid. IIª-IIae, q. 145 a. 2 co.)
    • ∴ God is the cause of beauty.
      • ∴ Truth is the cause of beauty.
  • "The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance‡.
  • "But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect.
    • ∴ "Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect" (ibid. Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 2), God.
    • God, Who has and is the divine intellect, exists outside of the human intellect, viz., He is objective. [St. Anselm's ontological argument: "God, being defined as most great or perfect, must exist, since a God who exists is greater than a God who does not" (New Oxford American Dictionary) and exists only in the mind.]
      • ∴ Truth is objective.
        • ∴ The cause of beauty is objective; ∴ beauty is objective.
* to the highest degree
** viz., truth, the 'equation of thought and thing'
† which is "found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason."
‡ Chance, or randomness, has neither clarity nor due proportion; therefore, chance is opposed to both beauty and reason.

The nested syllogisms above are of the form:

  • Proposition A
  • Proposition B
    • ∴ Conclusion / Proposition A*, etc.

Is not it utterly amazing how truth, beauty, and reason relate to one another because of God?

Many scientists, e.g., Einstein and Dirac, thought a beautiful explanation of nature is the truest, but they have defeated themselves by failing to realize the connection—because of their often relativist, positivist, and atheist philosophical assumptions—between absolute truth and beauty, thus severing the link between these: reason.

It is no wonder that we moderns—who eschew God and a true study of God, Thomistic theology, from universities—often have little desire to seek absolute truth and beauty and often have a very primitive aesthetics, evidenced, e.g., by the current iconoclastic trends in architecture. Theology is absolutely critical to a property functioning university and true science.

After having visited Thomas Aquinas College (TAC) in Santa Paula, CA, (read their amazing founding document), I have been inspired to pursue further the idea of starting a Catholic Technical Institute (CTI), a sort of tech-biased version of the more liberal-arts–biased TAC. For further background on this sort of university and its importance to science, read Newman's Idea of a University. In a nutshell, we need a tech university that prepares future physicists, e.g., to combat both skepticism and relativism, a university that acknowledges both faith and reason as legitimate means to an absolute truth. Skepticism and the denial of an absolute truth toward which the various sciences strive renders knowledge once obtained meaningless. If there is no real connection between the objective world viewed by physicists and psychologists, e.g., then what use is knowledge in either field? Is it even knowledge or a fabrication, perhaps self-consistent but isolated in itself? This connection between the sciences is called theology, and the lack of theology in schools—especially the "perennial philosophy" of St. Thomas—is really a bigger issue than one may think.

I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject-matter is one; for the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together, that we cannot separate off portion from portion, and operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction; and then again, as to its Creator, though He of course in His own Being is infinitely separate from it, and Theology has its departments towards which human knowledge has no relations, yet He has so implicated Himself with it, and taken it into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His providence over it, His impressions upon it, and His influences through it, that we cannot truly or fully contemplate it without in some main aspects contemplating Him. Next, sciences are the results of that mental abstraction, which I have spoken of, being the logical record of this or that aspect of the whole subject-matter of knowledge. As they all belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and all connected together; as they are but aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other. And further, the comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and of a philosophical habit of mind, and which in these Discourses I shall call by that name. This is what I have to say about knowledge and philosophical knowledge generally; and now I proceed to apply it to the particular science, which has led me to draw it out.

I say, then, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance. Not even Theology itself, though it comes from heaven, though its truths were given once for all at the first, though they are more certain on account of the Giver than those of mathematics, not even Theology, so far as it is relative to us, or is the Science of Religion, do I exclude from the law to which every mental exercise is subject, viz., from that imperfection, which ever must attend the abstract, when it would determine the concrete. Nor do I speak only of Natural Religion; for even the teaching of the Catholic Church, in certain of its aspects, that is, its religious teaching, is variously influenced by the other sciences. Not to insist on the introduction of the Aristotelic philosophy into its phraseology, its explanation of dogmas is influenced by ecclesiastical acts or events; its interpretations of prophecy are directly affected by the issues of history; its comments upon Scripture by the conclusions of the astronomer and the geologist; and its casuistical decisions by the various experience, political, social, and psychological, with which times and places are ever supplying it.

What Theology gives, it has a right to take; or rather, the interests of Truth oblige it to take. If we would not be beguiled by dreams, if we would ascertain facts as they are, then, granting Theology is a real science, we cannot exclude it, and still call ourselves philosophers. I have asserted nothing as yet as to the pre-eminent dignity of Religious Truth; I only say, if there be Religious Truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it without prejudice to truth of every kind, physical, metaphysical, historical, and moral; for it bears upon all truth. And thus I answer the objection with which I opened this Discourse. I supposed the question put to me by a philosopher of the day, "Why cannot you go your way, and let us go ours?" I answer, in the name of the Science of Religion, "When Newton can dispense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense with us."

[...]

Now, as far as this objection relates to any supposed opposition between secular science and divine, which is the subject on which I am at present engaged, I made a sufficient answer to it in my foregoing Discourse. In it I said, that, in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; and no one science, no two sciences, no one family of sciences, nay, not even all secular science, is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters to a very great extent into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it on one side, in compliment to secular science, is simply, under colour of a compliment, to do science a great damage. I do not say that every science will be equally affected by the omission; pure mathematics will not suffer at all; chemistry will suffer less than politics, politics than history, ethics, or metaphysics; still, that the various branches of science are intimately connected with each other, and form one whole, which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable department of knowledge, this I consider undeniable. As the written and unwritten word of God make up Revelation as a whole, and the written, taken by itself, is but a part of that whole, so in turn Revelation itself may be viewed as one of the constituent parts of human knowledge, considered as a whole, and its omission is the omission of one of those constituent parts. Revealed Religion furnishes facts to the other sciences, which those sciences, left to themselves, would never reach; and it invalidates apparent facts, which, left to themselves, they would imagine. Thus, in the science of history, the preservation of our race in Noah's ark is an historical fact, which history never would arrive at without Revelation; and, in the province of physiology and moral philosophy, our race's progress and perfectibility is a dream, because Revelation contradicts it, whatever may be plausibly argued in its behalf by scientific inquirers. It is not then that Catholics are afraid of human knowledge, but that they are proud of divine knowledge, and that they think the omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine, to be, as far as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance.

—Card. John Henry Newman's Idea of a University, part 1. ch. 3 §4 & ch. 4 §1

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

Einstein and Catholicism

Did you ever know that Einstein's Catholic elementary school education was responsible for his lifelong wonder of the universe and its orderliness, the Λογος (Logos), "Word of God, or principle of divine reason and creative order, identified in the Gospel of John with the second person of the Trinity incarnate in Jesus Christ" (New Oxford American Dictionary)? From Einstein: His Life and Universe (pgs. 15 & 20):
[...] when Albert turned 6 and had to go to school, his parents did not care that there was no Jewish one near their home. Instead he went to the large Catholic school in their neighborhood, the Petersschule. As the only Jew among the seventy students in his class, Einstein took the standard course in Catholic religion and ended up enjoying it immensely. Indeed, he did so well in his Catholic studies that he helped his classmates with theirs. [...] Einstein avoided religious rituals for the rest of his life. [...] He did, however, retain from his childhood religious phase a profound reverence for the harmony and beauty of what he called the mind of God as it was expressed in the creation of the universe and its laws.
This reverence, even for a scientist, is not something to be left in one's childhood, for "unless you be converted, and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." (Mt. 18:3). Even in his adulthood Einstein pondered the mystery of transubstantiation:
Father Charlie had come to talk about Christ in light of Einstein's theories and Einstein obliged and directed the discussion towards the Mass. "What is it? What happens?" Einstein asked his guest. Father Charlie explained that during Mass heaven and earth are joined by the infinite living body of Christ when the whole substance of bread and wine becomes the true body and blood of Christ, only the appearances of the bread and wine remaining. Einstein became extremely interested in the concept of transubstantiation, the changing of one substance into an other. He asked Father Charlie to explain the conversion in the Eucharist, by the priest at Mass. Father Charlie eagerly explained transubstantiation to his host as analogous to Einstein's famous formula E=mc²: Just as matter can be broken into energy-God becomes present on earth in the Mass.

While Einstein listened attentively, Father Charlie said, "During the Last Supper Christ said to his disciples, 'This is my body [τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σῶμά μου], this is my blood [τοῦτο ἐστιν τὸ αἷμά], that is being shed for you.' This means that what looks like bread and wine by God's power have become the body and blood of Christ."

"Then this means," Einstein said, "that Christ is infinite and timeless."

—Christ with a Priest's Face

The Catholic Mass with which Einstein was familiar and during which the mystery of transubstantiation occurs is the following:

Fr. Calvin Goodwin, Fraternity of Saint Peter (FSSP), commentates the Extraordinary Form of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. To view more videos about the Extraordinary Form (called also by the various names "Gregorian Rite masses," "Latin masses," "Tridentine masses," etc.), buy the FSSP's DVD The Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite: An Instructional Video for Priests and Seminarians.