Showing posts with label mathematics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mathematics. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Neo-Pythagoreanism

Here is the exchange between my friend who is interested in Duhem:
this comes from a recent article my "Duhem" Google alert found for me:

Babette Babich, “Heidegger’s Jews: Inclusion/Exclusion and Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 47, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 133–56, doi:10.1080/00071773.2016.1139927.

Babich, as fn. #62 says, is a student of Lonergan.

Here's where he discusses Duhem, ending with an interesting observation. I haven't read Duhem's La science allemande in its entirety; just the part I sent you regarding Einstein and the "geometric/'mathematical' mind."


By contrast, especially for those of us up on our Laruelle or our Stiegler or Meillassoux or our Simondon, and even in conjunction with the present theme, thinking of identities and differences, thinking of Heidegger and his Jews in a French context, who reads Pierre Duhem, author of the posthumous German Science?50 Have we today – even those of us interested, as I am interested, in the history and philosophy and sociology of science – any political geography of theory in science in connection to or with hermeneutic reflection? In connection to Heidegger, ah, yes, but not with respect to questioning science much less technology? We leave to those in power their game plan, and we do so without remainder. Critical theory has thus managed not to be critical for years.

Where Duhem in 1916 criticizes the German turn of mind as it finds expression in Gustav Kirchoff, a theorist of mathematical physics, we could find Heidegger's words along with Duhem's critique: “We can and will posit [poser] …  Wir können und wollen setzen … ”51 Note that this stipulative posing is by no means limited to a dogmatic and axiomatic controversy. The mathematician David Hilbert made this the watchword of the so-called Göttingen programme, which project included Husserl.52 As Duhem continues to refute Heinrich Hertz's explicitly deductive construction of mechanics,53 the problem is not that the postulate is arbitrary but rather that it is, out of context and history, thereby articulated, “imperiously”: “Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas. [I will it thus, I order it thus; let my will stand in the place of reason.]”54 What Duhem ultimately sought, fierce as his gainsaying was, was only the inclusion of specifically French science—this would be the torch later taken up by Bachelard and Canguilhelm and today, if less and less, Serres—finally admitted to the table along with German science: “Scientia germanica ancilla scientiae gallicae.”55

In the published version we can read Duhem citing Nietzsche's contemporary and fellow philologist, Hermann Diels: “the German is, here and now, on this earth, the sanctuary in which the principle of order takes refuge.”56 Yet it is Duhem's extended citation of Wilhelm Ostwald that is arguably the most disturbing, even using the language of a “great secret” with respect to the German:
Germany wants to organize Europe which, until now, has not been organized. I shall now explain to you the great secret of Germany. We, or perhaps rather the German race, have discovered the factor of organization. Other people still live under the regimes of individualism, when we are under that of organization.57
When Duhem asks “[w]as Scholasticism not essentially, as German science is, a work of the mathematical mind”58 he can seem to approximate Heidegger's standpoint in his Beiträge with respect to what Heidegger names Machenshaft, where Heidegger writes in GA 95 (Überlegungen VIII, 5) of the Black Notebooks currently under discussion. “One of the most secret forms of the gigantic, and perhaps the oldest, is the persistent skillfulness in calculating, pushing, and intermingling through which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.”59 Or else and still more troublingly, when Heidegger writes:
the temporary increase in the power of Jewry has its ground in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, served as the point of attachment for the diffusion of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative skill, which in this way lodged itself in the “spirit” without ever being able to grasp the concealed domains of decision on its own. The more original and inceptive the coming decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible will they remain to this “race.”60
This last is only a prelude to the most infamous of these quotes:
That in the age of machination, race is elevated to the explicit and specially erected “principle” of history (or just of historiology) is not the arbitrary stipulation of “doctrinaires” but a consequence of the power of machination, which must cast down beings, in all their regions, into planned calculation.61
It can be argued that what Duhem calls “German science” corresponds to what would come to be called “Jewish science”.62


52 I discuss this with attention to the time that was the first few decades of the twentieth century in the philosophy of science (and mathematics) in Babich, “Early Continental Philosophy of Science.
53 “Let us agree that this point – which is itself nothing but an algebraic expression, only a world of geometric consonance take to designate an ensemble of n numbers – changes, from one instant to another, by an algebraic formula. From this convention, so perfectly algebraic in nature, so completely arbitrary in appearance, we deduce, with perfect rigor, the consequences that calculation can draw from it, and we say that we are setting forth mechanics.” Duhem, “Some Reflections on German Science”, p. 93
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 112.
56 Duhem, “German Science and German Virtues”, here p. 122.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 123
59 Heidegger, Überlegungen VIII, 5, GA 95, p. 97.
60 Heidegger, GA 96, pp. 46 (from Überlegungen XII, 24).
61 Heidegger, Ibid., p. 38.
62 That argument can be made, but for his part, Duhem is talking about “scholasticism”, that is what my old Jesuit teacher, the Canadian Thomist, Bernard Lonergan, author of the conspicuously named Method in Theology (1972) and Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957), with its famous listings of points to the seemingly nth degree, no mere sic et non, took the mid-twentieth century to an extraordinary pitch well beyond the tradition of generalized empirical method of “transcendental Thomism” inaugurated by the Belgian Jesuit philosopher, Joseph Maréchal. Indeed, Maréchal was probably one of the reasons Lonergan was able to answer my questions regarding the intersection of mysticism and empiricism as well as he did. Maréchal's initial main works included: Le point de départ de la métaphysique: leçons sur le développement historique et théorique du problème de la connaissance, 5 vols (Bruges-Louvain, 1922–47) and Études sur le psychologie des mystiques, 2 vols (1926, 1937).

German/Jewish science (my attempt at a compact definition): a fabricated (magical) new “physical” science derived from hypothetical equations—e.g. relativistic dynamics and its geometric implications dictating the replacement of a planar space with a gravitational field by a curved spacetime without gravitational field. The transition from the former to the latter is essentially magical, thanks to the concoction of highly elegant algebraic tools. It would therefore be worth investigating how the actual magic, in the truly occult sense of the term, has impacted “Jewish science” and its use of mathematics (as the intellectual Talmudic culture is riddled with magic practices related to gematric ideas).
Also, as I read a little bit of Duhem’s writings and get a sense of his Ampèrian affinities, I’m wondering whether he was aware of (and, if so, what he thought of) the tensor-based reformulation of electrodynamics (relativistically rewriting Maxwell’s equations to account for the electromagnetic potential in terms of R4 using an electromagnetic field tensor and a current tensor). Electrodynamics assuming GR has always bothered me a great deal because it essentially unifies Einsteinian gravitation (its spacetime continuum) and electromagnetism by way of geometry, not physics (as though the physics of E&M was ultimately dependent upon and constrained by the non-physical relativistic dogma of gravitation). 

Yes, that was fascinating. And the author quoted Duhem's German. Duhem published in French, English, and German, and knew Latin and Greek as well as reading comprehension in Italian! He was a true polymath and polyglot.

"Ampèrian affinities":
Duhem certainly admired Ampère's experimental and theoretical genius, but he disagreed with Ampère's Newtonian inductivism, which held that "phénomènes électrodynamiques" are "uniquement déduite de l’expérience," as Ampère subtitled his famous work. Duhem discusses this in his Théorie physique ch. 6,
  • §4 (PDF p. 154): a critique of Newton himself ("Critique de la méthode newtonienne. - Premier exemple : La Mécanique céleste")
  • §5 (PDF p. 158): a critique of Ampère ("Critique de la méthode newtonienne (suite ). – Second exemple : L’Électrodynamique").
(Duhem was very good at making everyone on all sides of a debate very uncomfortable. ☺)

Duhem was familiar with Riemann's mathematics. We know this based on a citation he made to a paper by the Italian mathematician Enrico Betti. Duhem's 2nd doctoral dissertation (the accepted one) was, after all, in the mathematics department; his 1st (the rejected one) was in the physics department.

By "tensor-based reformulation of electrodynamics," are you referring to Maxwell's quaternion way of writing things? For example, in his Treatise on Electricity & Magnetism (vol. 2), p. 232-233, where he introduces the displacement current, he wrote the Maxwell-Ampère Law
∇×B⇀=μ0J⇀+μ0ε0∂E⇀∂t\nabla \times \vec{B} = \mu_{0} \vec{ J} + \mu_{0} \varepsilon_{0} \frac{{\partial \vec{E}}}{\partial tas
4πC=V∇H,4\pi \mathfrak{C} = V \nabla \mathfrak{H
where
C=ℜ+D,˙{\mathfrak{C}} = \Re + \dot{\mathfrak{D}}i.e., (true current) = (conduction current) + (displacement current);
H\mathfrak{H} is the magnetic force;
V∇V\nabla is the vector part of ∇
\nabla
(i.e., curl).


Regarding "occult" and "gematric [geometric?] ideas" in physics:
    I like Steiner (2009)'s term "Pythagorean analogies," i.e., "analogies inexpressible in any other language but that of pure mathematics" (Karam 2014); he cites Maxwell's displacement current as the first example of a "Pythagorean analogy" in physics.

Here are Duhem's views of quaternions and vector analysis (Théorie physique ch. 4, §6 "L’École anglaise et la Physique mathématique," PDF p. 62-63):
Mais chez les Anglais seuls l’amplitude d’esprit se trouve d’une manière fréquente, habituelle, endémique ; aussi est-ce seulement parmi les hommes de science anglais que les Algèbres symboliques, le calcul des quaternions, la vector-analysis, sont usuels ; la plupart des traités anglais se servent de ces langages complexes et abrégés. Ces langages, les mathématiciens français ou allemands ne les apprennent pas volontiers ; ils n’arrivent jamais à les parler couramment ni surtout à penser directement sous les formes qui les composent ; pour suivre un calcul mené selon la méthode des quaternions ou de la vector-analysis, il leur en faut faire la version en Algèbre classique. Un des mathématiciens français qui avaient le plus profondément étudié les diverses espèces de calculs symboliques, Paul Morin, me disait un jour : « Je ne suis jamais sûr d’un résultat obtenu par la méthode des quaternions avant de l’avoir retrouvé par notre vieille Algèbre cartésienne. »
Also, you would be very interested in the
Notice sur les Titres et Travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem rédigée par lui-même lors de sa candidature à l'Académie des sciences (mai 1913)
While Duhem wrote most of it—summarizing all his scientific, philosophical, and historical researches—, Jordan wrote the biography section, Hadamard wrote the section on the mathematical aspects of Duhem's works, and Darbon (whom you may not have heard of) wrote the section on Duhem's history of physics.

By the way, some considered Duhem "anti-Semitic" because of his stance on the Dreyfus affair, yet he was close friends with the Jew Hadamard, who held a very high opinion of Duhem.

Also, Duhem's influence has been vast, across many fields. For example, the economist Schumpeter, in his preface to Fr. Dempsey, S.J.'s erudite defense of the moderns' understanding of interest and the medievals' arguments against usury, Interest & Usury, mentions how Fr. Dempsey did for economics what Duhem did for physics; they both showed the medievals' contributions to their respective modern disciplines.

Thanks for this rich piece of Duhemian insights and many references! Quite dense, owing to the vast extent (“across many fields”) of Duhem’s multi-layer thought and writings.



Yes Maxwell’s equations can be reformulated using matrix operators to represent quaternions. But, in field theories, quaternions are broader algebraic tools than tensors and need not include any “relativistic” alteration. Thus “Maxwell’s quaternion way of writing things” is not exactly the same as a tensor-based reformulation of electrodynamics. The tensor version of Maxwell’s equations (deriving E&M from the deformation of R4 geometry) describes the relationship between the electromagnetic potential Aµ (which, from the perspective of quaternion operators, would be defined as a quadri-vector potential), the electromagnetic field strength tensor Fµv (when Fµv = ωµv), and the current tensor jµ, yielding the “homogenous” form of Maxwell’s equations:



∂kFµv + ∂µFvk + ∂vFkµ = 0.

∂2Aµ = jµ ,

where ∂2 = ∂02 - ∂12- ∂22 - ∂32 = c-2∂t2 - ∇x2



“Gematric”, referring (adjectively) to the Jewish gematria and its many occult misuses of mathematics and numbers.



Fascinating quote pertaining to “Duhem’s views of quaternions and vector analysis”! Besides Cauchy and his stress tensor, I cannot think of many French mathematicians and natural philosophers with a taste for the kind of algebraic operations used in quaternion, vector, and tensor analyses.

Oh, I see. You were referring to relativity theory's tensorial "simplification" of Maxwell's equations. To my knowledge, Duhem never wrote about that (at least not directly, by writing relativity's "'homogenous' form of Maxwell’s equations").

Re: "Duhem’s multi-layer thought and writings":
    Duhem even spoke about Loti, Corneille, Shakespeare, and Dickens in his Théorie physique. Duhem contrasts Corneille with Shakespeare (∵ he considers both as not strictly having an esprit de géométrie) and Loti with Dickens (∵ both are prime examples of an esprit de géométrie). I read Tale of Two Cities because I was curious if Dickens indeed has an "English mind" (esprit de géométrie), and he certainly does; I wasn't that impressed with Tale of Two Cities because it didn't have much of an "Ariadne's thread" (coherent idea/theme) running through it. It was a disconnected smorgasbord of events and myriads of characters. As Hertz said, Maxwell's theory is nothing more than Maxwell's equations. Maxwell did not even derive these equations from a single principle, like an energy law, which was customary to do in E&M in the era between Ampére and Maxwell; thus, Maxwell's theory is an example par excellence of the English/German/geometrical mind, juggling many disconnected ideas around—which Poincaré said, in that quote I sent you awhile back [translated on p. 8 of this], makes French minds ill-at-ease when reading Maxwell for the first time.
    Have you read any Corneille? I know he wrote Le Cid; have you seen/read that? Does it exemplify the French esprit de finesse?

Duhem certainly is not opposed to analogies in physics. Classification is impossible without the ability to form analogies, and Duhem defines physical theory as a classification of experimental laws (not a classification of equations!). Duhem explicitly mentions "analogie" in Physique du croyant p. 146 ff. (on the analogy between cosmology [natural philosophy] and physical theory; Duhem essentially proves Aristotle Physica 191a7-8: "The underlying nature is known by analogy."), which you may have already read. He describes very well what Fr. Wallace, O.P., says is the "teaching that is distinctive of Thomism," i.e., that "analogical middle terms are sufficient for a valid demonstration" (cf. this). This is vital for there to be "mixed sciences" or scientia media, where minor and major premises are taken from distinct fields, like mathematics and physics, with distinct principles of their own. Fr. William A. Wallace, O.P., who pioneered research into Galileo's logical treatises, describes this very well in the best logic-of-science work I've ever read: The Modeling of Nature (if Duhem wrote a logical work, which I wish he did!, it would probably be similar to Fr. Wallace's).

Thus, what I think best describes "German" or "Jewish science" is not that it uses analogy, which all physical theory does, but that it's Neo-Pythagorean, inverting the 1st (physical) and 2nd (mathematical) degrees of abstraction. Duhem, where he mentions Einstein in the La science allemande, makes it clear that one cannot define time from a mathematical equation as Einstein does. The inversion of the first two degrees of abstraction has become so extreme that Max Tegmark, who is a hardcore Pythagorean, even wrote a paper on the "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis," i.e., that the universe is mathematics! Pythagoreans appear to be the first gematrists.

I was pleased to see Steiner (2009) quote Peirce regarding analogies between physical theories (p. 52fn9):
These universal super-laws were, to Peirce's thinking, the key to the formal mathematical analogies we see between laws—such as the inverse square laws in gravity and electricity—analogies that demand explanation (7.509-7.511). But Peirce looked to these super-laws also to explain, not only the mathematical form of laws, but even the specific values of the constants (like the gravitational constant) appearing in them.
This reminds me of what St. Thomas said is impossible in that Super Iob quote I sent you, where he says some things cannot have a natural explanation but are up to the will of God. A "physical" theory being the analogy between two mathematical laws is not a physical theory, but a mathematical one, at best, and a confusing of mathematics with the will of God, at worst.

This reminds me: I need to read the article ["De Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam"] by Fr. Ramírez, O.P., that formed the foundation of his multi-volume De Analogia. Fr. Rimírez is the master of analogy, and I'm curious what he has to say about Duhem claim that (p. 147):
…si l'on prononce à cet endroit les mots de preuve par analogie, il convient d'en fixer exactement le sens et de ne point confondre une telle preuve avec une véritable démonstration logique. Une analogie se sent ; elle ne se conclut pas ; elle ne s'impose pas à l'esprit de tout le poids du principe de contradiction. Là où un penseur voit une analogie, un autre, plus vivement frappé par les contrastes des termes à comparer que par leurs ressemblances, peut fort bien voir une opposition ; pour amener celui-ci à changer sa négation en affirmation, celui-là ne saurait user de la force irrésistible du syllogisme…
How is "preuve par analogie" not "une véritable démonstration logique" thet "ne se conclut pas" and "ne s'impose pas à l'esprit de tout le poids du principe de contradiction"?


The formalism of quaternions was very much Maxwellian in spirit and has actually been extended in Germano-Anglo-American electromagnetic field theory on the basis of the tensor field equations of Einstein. But it is the introduction of the electromagnetic tensor field Fµv, combined with the spin connection vector ωab (the electrodynamics simplification of this amounts to equating F and ω by retranslating the latter into a rotation tensor, ωµv) that makes up for “relativity theory’s tensorial "simplification" of Maxwell’s equations”, which consists in the merging of electrodynamics with GR I was referring to (and wondering whether Duhem had had any thought on this “tensorization” of E&M, which is all the rage today among pan-relativists).

About tragedians and the difference between “esprit de finesses” and “esprit de géométrie”, Duhem was probably keen on his contrasting assessment of Corneille and Shakespeare on the one hand and Loti Dickens on the other. Corneille, as Molière, also was a comedy writer and therefore, to my view, does exemplify something of “un esprit de finesse”, since finesse was rather characteristic of the kind of spirit 17th century French political/social satires would famously convey through penetrating comedies (hardly the under-the-belt level of our contemporary late wisecracking shows on T.V.).     

Regarding the centrality of analogies to the life of the created intellect, you correctly write: “Classification is impossible without the ability to form analogies”, and logically justify the validity of Duhem’s definition of “physical theory as a classification of experimental laws”, namely by way of analogous abstraction (which is what modeling physical data in the logical formal of a physical theory really amounts to). In a broader (cross-field) sense, I would define analogicity (ἀνα-λογία, meaning quite literally the logic of comparative relation between that which is lower to that which is higher) as a critical way of both intuitively and intellectually seeing the similitude of the invisible (the higher) mirrored in the visible (the lower). Both the Hebrew word for intellectus (בִינָה, “understanding” as the attitude of the intellect seeing in between two things, meaning re-cognizing the like features by which two essentially distinct things can coherently be related) and the Aramaic word for “comparison” (ܒ݁ܡܰܬ݂ܠܶܐ ,מתלא) clearly suggest that an analogy is actually more than simply a ratio-nal proportion (in the arithmetic, Aristotelian sense). In revealed anthropology, it appears (my theory) that the created intellect (whose life is intellectus) is constitutionally analogic (together in inner structure and cognitive motion).

I did notice Duhem’s mention of analogy in Physique du croyant.  The distinction he makes (referring to your final question) between “preuve par analogie” and “une véritable démonstration logique” does not imply that the first is less intellectually powerful and epistemologically meaningful than the second. In fact, a mere logical demonstration, however valid, may not have the same epistemological value as a proof by analogy, even though the latter’s proof value is technically more limited than a syllogistic demonstration. What this means is that analogical knowledge is not reducible to logical validity. Thus a little like he did in La science allemande—first lesson (Les Sciences de Raisonnement)—when distinguishing between axioms and theorems (which the following sentence on p. 6 summarizes like an aphorism: “Les principes se sentent, les propositions se concluent…”), Duhem is essentially right to say on p. 147 of Physique du croyant: “Une analogie se sent ; elle ne se conclut pas…”      

The confusion of degrees of abstraction you talk about is indeed critical! My sense is that it is typically indulged in because there is actually more to numbers and their multifaceted relations and properties than their simply being abstract entities bereft of positive existence outside the mind (entia rationis).1 However, no one really knows how much more, and what the true nature of this “more” is. That is the reason why mathematical physics can really lead to ontological problems (as the nature of the 2nd degree of abstraction is so evasive), but without possibly providing a solution. If you remember, it was the sense of my comparative (analogical) “syllogism” used here to extend Gödel’s incompleteness results from mathematics to all-encompassing Neo-Pythagorean physical theories whose ultimate Galilean assumption is that “the universe is mathematics.”

“Duhem, where he mentions Einstein in the La science allemande, makes it clear that one cannot define time from a mathematical equation as Einstein does.”

Yes, and it is very significant that Newton did not include “time” in his descriptive “universal super-law” of gravitation, while Einstein did. The Neo-Pythagorean thinking undergirding GR and its inclusion of the time dimension times the square root of - 1 was never meant to account for empirical results (contrary to the regular claims appealing to the “countless corroborations” of the curved geometry of Einsteinian gravitational field). GR was intended to provide a mathematical way out of the contradiction between the instantaneous Newtonian gravitational field and the new principles couched in the Einsteinian formulas pertaining to spacetime in SR (implying action at a distance).
I read Fr. Ramírez’s The authority of St. Thomas, not his De Analogia.

Monday, December 22, 2014

Chaos: The Film


Chaos: The Film

Hadamard's Pamphlets contains the paper "Les surfaces à courbures opposées et leurs lignes géodésiques" (p. 71; cf. Jaki's Uneasy Genius p. 350fn113), a classic in chaos theory that inspired "Duhem's bull" (e.g., in his Aim & Structure of Physical Theory p. 139 ff.). "Duhem's bull" is mentioned in part 5 of this Chaos: The Film.

Saturday, November 23, 2013

St. Thomas on Mathematics's Certitude

St. Thomas Aquinas attests to mathematics's certitude:
  1. In I An. Post. l. 42 n. 8: "For these ["first things," e.g., axioms, demonstrations, definitions, constructions, etc.] are understood in virtue of themselves; and such knowledge of these things is more certain than any science, because it is from such knowledge that science acquires its certitude."
  2. In II De Anima l. 3 n. 245: "In…mathematics…what is the more knowable is such both in itself and relatively to us." (Mathematics is thus most "co-natural" to the human intellect.)
  3. In I An. Post. l. 1 n. 8: "Of these (demonstrations) the best are the mathematical sciences because of their most certain manner of demonstrating."
  4. In II Met. l. 5 n. 336: "[T]he things with which mathematics deals are abstracted from matter, they do not surpass our understanding; and therefore in their case most certain reasoning is demanded."
  5. In I Eth. l. 3 n. 36: "Mathematics is concerned with matter in which perfect certitude is found."
  6. In X Eth. l. 7 n. 2043: "[G]eometricians who take pleasure in the study of geometry can grasp more clearly each problem of this science because their mind is detained longer by that which is pleasant." (Thus, mathematics is beautiful because of its certitude.)
(cf. "Cap. XII. La certeza matematica" of the excellent Filosofía de las Matemáticas en Santo Tomás, pp. 125 ff., by José Alvarez Laso, C.M.F.)

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Everything is not Mathematics.

Regarding cosmologist Max Tegmark's "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH)" (cf. Is the Universe Actually Made of Math?, interview with me about Level IV in Discover Magazine, 6/16 2008), it seems he has an overly broad conception of what mathematics is.
  • Mathematics is the study of discrete or continuous quantity;
"Mathematics does not deal with motion [change] and is not abstract [for this sense of abstract, see Armand Mauer's introduction to his translation of Thomas Aquinas's Division and Methods of the Sciences], for it investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from movement, which forms being connected with matter cannot really be separated from bodies."
    • Thomas Aquinas, in Division and Methods of the Sciences q. 5 a. 3, argues that mathematics treats "without motion [change] and matter, of what exists in matter."
      • See also this question's 5th objection, regarding how "mathematics treats without motion," and his reply to it, where he says "it does not belong to the mathematician to treat of motion, although mathematical principles can be applied to motion." He also shows mathematical physics is an "intermediate science" (scientia media), since it's materially physical and formally mathematical.
    • Cf. Peirce's "The Nature of Mathematics," ch. 10 (p. 135) of The Philosophy of Peirce.
"substance means those parts which, being present in such things, limit them and designate them as individuals and as a result of whose destruction the whole is destroyed; for example, body is destroyed when surface is, as some say, and surface when line is. And in general it seems to some that number is of this nature; for [according to them] if it is destroyed, nothing will exist, and it limits all things."
Thomas Aquinas commentates (Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 10 n. 3 [900-1]):
"He gives a third meaning of substance, which is the one used by the Platonists and Pythagoreans. He says that all those parts of the foregoing substances which constitute their limits and designate them as individuals, according to the opinion of these thinkers, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, are also termed substances. For example, body is destroyed when surface is, as some say, and surface when line is. It is also clear that surface is the limit of body and line the limit of surface. And according to the opinion of the philosophers just mentioned the line is a part of surface and surface a part of body. For they held that bodies are composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines of points; and thus it would follow that the point is the substance of the line, the line the substance of surface, and so on for the rest. And according to this position number seems to constitute the entire substance of all things, because when number is destroyed nothing remains in the world; for what is not one is nothing. And similarly things which are not many are non-existent. And number is also found to limit all things, because all things are measured by number.

"But this sense of substance is not a true one. For that which is found to be common to all things and is something without which they cannot exist does not necessarily constitute their substance, but it can be some property flowing from the substance or from a principle of the substance. These philosophers also fell into error especially regarding unity and number because they failed to distinguish between the unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number."
  • ∴ everything is not mathematics.

Monday, April 23, 2012

Mathematical Nominalism vs. Mathematical Realism

From the comments to the posting here:
Of course we want to hear about mathematics!
You should do some posts on Thomism and mathematics. The literature out there on St. Thomas's conception of mathematics seems very sparse. I especially would like to see some studies of how a Thomist views calculus, infinitesimals, etc.
There are some things, for example: My quotes of St. Thomas on mathematics; ch. 6 of Mullahy's Thomism & Mathematical Physics (PDF pgs. 264 ff.) is entitled "The Nature of Mathematical Abstraction"; "A neglected Thomistic text on the foundation of mathematics" by Armand A Maurer; and St. Thomas on the object of geometry by Vincent Edward Smith. These are all online for free.
Also, if you don't know about Augustin-Louis Cauchy, read this Dictionary of Scientific Biography article on him. I quote it: "More concepts and theorems have been named for Cauchy than for any other mathematician (in elasticity alone there are sixteen concepts and theorems named for Cauchy)." In his Cours d'Analyse, he proved the Fundamental Theorems of Calculus and Algebra, described partial fraction decomposition, devised convergence tests, and was the first to devise the ε-δ formulation of the limit (cf. this article by a prominent Cauchy historian; I love how it begins! A proper understanding of calculus is absolutely vital for understanding the power and limits of modern mathematical physics.). Of course Cauchy is also famous for complex integrals. Since he was a devout Catholic, I've been wondering if he was well-versed in Thomism. He studied classics before becoming a mathematician, so it's possible. I'm not sure he wrote any treatise on the philosophy of mathematics, though.
My follow-up:
Definitely read St. Thomas's In Boethium De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3: "Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of What Exists in Matter?". (Questions 5 and 6 of In Boethium De Trinitate are also called St. Thomas's Division and Methods of the Sciences.) Cf. also St. Thomas's commentary In II Phys. lect. 3.
From what I have read, it seems that Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics does well making sense of the everyday mathematics your average person on the street uses, e.g. arithmetic, combinatorics, geometry, and other discrete disciplines.
Aristotle and St. Thomas certainly distinguished discrete and continuous quantity (cf. Summa I q. 3 a. 3: "punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuae, et unitas quantitatis discretae": "a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity").
However, like you say, it would be interesting to see if an account of infinitesimals, calculus, the larger infinities, etc. could be given, while remaining a realist (rather than nominalist) theory of mathematics.
St. Thomas, in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, deals very well with the "mathematical nominalist objection" to actual infinities in nature (be they infinitely large {cardinalities of Cantor sets}, infinitely small {infinitesimals}, etc.): From In III Phys. lect. 7:
[...] [Aristotle] says that it is impossible for the infinite to be separated from sensible things, in such a way that the infinite should be something existing of itself, as the Platonists laid down. For if the infinite is laid down as something separated, either it has a certain quantity (namely, continuous, which is size [magnitudo], or discrete, which is number [multitudo]), or not. If it is a substance without either the accident of size or that of number, then the infinite must be indivisible—since whatever is divisible is either number or size. But if something is indivisible, it will not be infinite except in the first way, namely, as something is called “infinite” [viz., "not finite"] which is not by nature susceptible to being passed through [better translation: "which is not surpass-able"], in the same way that a sound is said to be “invisible” [as not being by nature susceptible to being seen], but this is not what is intended in the present inquiry concerning the infinite, nor by those who laid down the infinite. For they did not intend to lay down the infinite as something indivisible, but as something that could not be passed through, i.e., as being susceptible to such, but with the passage having no completion.
So, it appears the mathematical nominalists are correct when it comes to mathematicals indirectly "separated [abstracted] from sensible things" (e.g., ∞, א, irrationals, etc., which are only ens rationis, "beings of reason" or "mind-dependent beings"), but they are incorrect in claiming that mathematicals of discrete (e.g., the number 2) and continuous quantity (e.g., a regular dodecahedron) can only be ens rationis (or our names of those ens rationis). The issue boils down to whether or not actual infinities exist in nature (cf., e.g., the whole Physics lecture above or the Summa questions: "Whether an actually infinite magnitude [magnitudo] can exist?" and "Whether an infinite multitude [multitudo] can exist?").
Also, Pierre Duhem—an early 20th century French, Catholic, Thomist physicist, philosopher of physics, and founder of the discipline of the history of medieval physics—wrote, contrary to Poincaré, that mathematical induction can be reduced to a finite syllogistic process.
Happy Easter!

Friday, January 6, 2012

Medieval Scholars Applied Math to Physics

The Medieval scholars had no aversion to applying mathematics to physics, which they classified as a "middle sciences," and which, because of their "conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical [i.e., natural-philosophical] sciences." (Summa Theologica II-II, q. 9, a. 2 ad 3).

Here are some physicists we rarely hear about because of the myth that the Middle Ages were "dark ages":
  • The medieval scientist Thomas Bradwardine determined in 1300 that for uniformly accelerated objects, d = ½ a t², which Fr. de Soto, O.P., (b. ca. 1494) applied to free-falling objects. (Before Galileo!)
  • Jean Buridan (d. ca. 1359) invented the momentum equation: p = m v. Some have proposed naming the unit of momentum after him, where 1 B = 1 kg m/s.
  • The French Bishop Nicole Oresme (d. 1382) determined mean speed theorem of uniformly accelerated body: vavg = vf / 2.
  • Bishop Oresme posed the famous Gedankenexperiment: “I posit that the Earth is pierced clear through and that we can see through a great hole farther and farther right up to the other end where the antipodes [poles] would be if the whole of this Earth were inhabited; I say, first of all, that if we dropped a stone through this hole, it would fall and pass beyond the center of the earth, going straight on toward the other side for a certain limited distance, and that then it would turn back going beyond the center on this side of the Earth; afterward, it would fall back again, going beyond the center but not so far as before; it would go and come this way several times with a reduction of its reflex motions until finally it would come to rest as the center of the Earth....” Quoted by K. V. Magruder from Le Livre du Ciel et due Monde (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), translated by D. Menut, pg. 573.
  • Bishop Oresme wrote (before Galilean relativity): “If air were enclosed in a moving ship, it would seem to the person situated in this air that it was not moved.” Book of the Heavens, Book II chapter 25, from Grant, A Source Book of Medieval Science, pg. 505, Harvard, 1974

Monday, November 28, 2011

Feynman on The Relation of Mathematics & Physics and on Probability & Uncertainty in Quantum

Lectures in 1964:

Cf. Thomism & Mathematical Physics.


Interestingly, although he says quantum is nothing like anything we have seen before, he later goes on saying that we can understand it in analogy to what we do know (cf. The interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas of Aristotle, Physica 191a7-8: "The underlying nature is known by analogy.", available from ProQuest Theses). New knowledge must be party based on what we already know (cf. Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1: "The need for pre-existent knowledge in all learning").

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Superluminal Neutrinos?

Are neutrino's really going faster than the speed of light?...Does this completely undermine all previous science? How do we answer those who suggest our knowledge is not stable, open to complete change overnight?
Ave Maria radio host Al Kresta interviews Dr. Anthony Rizzi, Director of the Institute for Advanced Physics.

This is the paper they speak about: "Measurement of the neutrino velocity with the OPERA detector in the CNGS beam"

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Mathematics: Its Importance and Limitations

Mathematics is most co-natural to man and it is also the most exact science according to St. Thomas Aquinas, says Bernard I. Mullahy in his excellent thesis Thomism and Mathematical Physics. Armand Maurer on pg. xxxv of his translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's Division and methods of the sciences, a commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate questions V and VI, says that
St. Thomas also attributes a major role to reasoning in mathematics. In this respect it is like natural philosophy. The difference in their methods lies in the causes employed in reasoning. Mathematical demonstrations begin with definitions and principles, from which conclusions are deduced by way of formal causality. For example, a certain property of the triangle is shown to follow from its very definition. Unlike natural philosophy, mathematics does not demonstrate through final or efficient causes.
Fr. McCool, S.J., wrote in his book on the history of 20th century Thomism that (pg. 154-155):
A new edition of St. Thomas' In Librum Boethii de Trinitate, Questiones quinta et sexta, published in 1948, led to a major revision of the accepted understanding of St. Thomas' theory of abstraction [which that of Boethius inspired]. Apart from the abstractio totius, abstraction of a sensible whole from its particulars required for any form of conceptual thought, the only other type of abstraction proposed by St. Thomas confines itself to the level of mathematics. This is an abstractio formae, the mind's separation of the form of quantity from the rest of the sensible whole which the mind disregards in mathematics.
Thus we can see that medieval philosophers recognized the great importance and certainty of mathematics. Yet, according to Armand Maurer,
St. Thomas saw that there is a particular temptation to single out the mathematical method for this role [of being a common method for all the sciences, as Descartes wished], since it is the most exact and certain. But he warns against this, insisting on the specificity of method in each of the sciences [natural philosophy (physics in the broad sense), mathematics, and metaphysics; modern physics is a natural philosophy / mathematics hybrid, a scientia media or "middle science"].
St. Thomas warns about this in In II Meta. lect. 5, n. 335-337, which says, commenting on Aristotle's answer regarding "The Method to Be Followed in the Search for Truth:"

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 994b 32-995a 20

171. The way in which people are affected by what they hear depends upon the things to which they are accustomed; for it is in terms of such things that we judge statements to be true, and anything over and above these does not seem similar but less intelligible and more remote. For it is the things to which we are accustomed that are better known.

172. The great force which custom has is shown by the laws, in which legendary and childish elements prevail over our knowledge of them, because of custom.

173. Now some men will not accept what a speaker says unless he speaks in mathematical terms; and others, unless he gives examples; while others expect him to quote a poet as an authority. Again, some want everything stated with certitude, while others find certitude annoying, either because they are incapable of comprehending anything, or because they consider exact inquiry to be quibbling; for there is some similarity. Hence it seems to some men that, just as liberality is lacking in the matter of a fee for a banquet, so also is it lacking in arguments.

174. For this reason one must be trained how to meet every kind of argument; and it is absurd to search simultaneously for knowledge and for the method of acquiring it; for neither of these is easily attained.

175. But the exactness of mathematics is not to be expected in all cases, but only in those which have no matter. This is why its method is not that of natural philosophy; for perhaps the whole of nature contains matter. Hence we must first investigate what nature is; for in this way it will become evident what the things are with which natural philosophy deals, and whether it belongs to one science or to several to consider the causes and principles of things.

that

[St. Thomas's] COMMENTARY

335. For this reason one must be trained (174).

He exposes the proper method of investigating the truth. Concerning this he does two things. First (335), he shows how a man can discover the proper method of investigating the truth. Second (336), he explains that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all matters (“But the exactness of mathematics”) .

He says, first, that since different men use different methods in the search for truth, one must be trained in the method which the particular sciences must use to investigate their subject. And since it is not easy for a man to undertake two things at once (indeed, so long as he tries to do both he can succeed in neither), it is absurd for a man to try to acquire a science and at the same time to acquire the method proper to that science. This is why a man should learn logic before any of the other sciences, because logic considers the general method of procedure in all the other sciences. Moreover, the method appropriate to the particular sciences should be considered at the beginning of these sciences.

336. But the exactness of mathematics (175).

He shows that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all the sciences. He says that the “exactness,” i.e., the careful and certain demonstrations, found in mathematics should not be demanded in the case of all things of which we have science, but only in the case of those things which have no matter; for things that have matter are subject to motion and change, and therefore in their case complete certitude cannot be had. For in the case of these things we do not look for what exists always and of necessity, but only for what exists in the majority of cases.

Now immaterial things are most certain by their very nature because they are unchangeable, although they are not certain to us because our intellectual power is weak, as was stated above (279). The separate substances are things of this kind. But while the things with which mathematics deals are abstracted from matter, they do not surpass our understanding; and therefore in their case most certain reasoning is demanded.

Again, because the whole of nature involves matter, this method of most certain reasoning does not belong to natural philosophy. However, he says “perhaps” because of the celestial bodies, since they do not have matter in the same sense that lower bodies do.

337. Now since this method of most certain reasoning is not the method proper to natural science, therefore in order to know which method is proper to that science we must investigate first what nature is; for in this way we will discover the things which natural philosophy studies. Further, we must investigate “whether it belongs to one science,” i.e., to natural philosophy, or to several sciences, to consider all causes and principles; for in this way we will be able to learn which method of demonstration is proper to natural philosophy. He deals with this method in Book II of the Physics, as is obvious to anyone who examines it carefully.

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

St. Albertus Magnus's Commentary on Euclid's Elements

St. Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) wrote extensively on physics methodology, among other fields like theology and the experimental sciences, and is credited for discovering arsenic. He said: "The aim of natural science is not simply to accept the statements [narrata] of others, but to investigate the causes that are at work in nature" (De Miner., lib. II, tr. ii, i) and "Experimentum solum certificat in talibus" ("Experiment is the only safe guide in such investigations;" De Veg., VI, tr. ii, i). Against what today one would call "intelligent design," St. Albert says: "In studying nature we have not to inquire how God the Creator may, as He freely wills, use His creatures to work miracles and thereby show forth His power: we have rather to inquire what Nature with its immanent causes can naturally bring to pass" (De Coelo et Mundo, I, tr. iv, x).
     The Dominican Scholastic philosopher Albertus Magnus (1193?-1280) acquired the title Doctor Universalis from the breadth of his learning, which astonished his contemporaries. His fame earned him a place in the Divine Comedy, where his most famous student, Thomas Aquinas, introduces him to Dante:
Questi che m'è a destra più vicino
Frate e maëstro fummi, ed esso Alberto
È di Cologna, e io Thomas d'Aquino. (Paradiso, X, 97-99)

He who is nearest to me on the right
Was my colleague and teacher, namely, Albert
Of Cologne, and I am Thomas Aquinas.
The program of the scholastic philosophers was to use the deductive method of mathematics to demonstrate by reason the existence of Deity and to describe His attributes, to prove the immortality of the soul, to assert free will, and in general to establish thereby the truth of the Catholic religion. Their first axiom was, that this was possible. Even Russell, who considered theology nothing more than organized ignorance, could nevertheless respect the Medieval mastery of logic:
     The medieval outlook of educated men had a logical unity which has now been lost. We may take Thomas Aquinas as the authoritative exponent of the creed which science was compelled to attack. He maintained—and his view is still that of the Roman Catholic Church—that some of the fundamental truths of the Christian religion could be proved by the unaided reason, without the help of revelation. Among these was the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent Creator. From His omnipotence and benevolence followed that He would not leave His creatures without knowledge of His decrees, to the extent that might be necessary to obey His will. There must therefore be a Divine revelation, which, obviously, is contained in the Bible and the decisions of the Church. This point being established, the rest of what we need to know can be inferred from the Scriptures and the pronouncements of oecumenical Councils. The whole argument proceeds deductively from premisses formerly accepted by almost the whole population of Christian countries, and if the argument is, to the modern reader, at times faulty, its fallacies were not apparent to the majority of learned contemporaries.
     Now logical unity is at once a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it insures that whoever accepts one stage of the argument must accept all later stages; it is a weakness because whoever rejects any of the later stages must also reject some, at least, of the earlier stages. The Church, in its conflict with science, exhibited both the strength and the weakness resulting from the logical coherence of its dogmas [Religion and Science, 12-13].
Within this program, it was the special enterprise of Albertus Magnus to interpret the works of Aristotle for his Medieval contemporaries, insofar as the writings of that philosopher could be known through the veil of Latin translations of Arabic translations of the Greek texts, which at that time covered the hearts of the learned. In so doing, he made a major contribution to culture, for Aristotle was interested in the natural world, and investigation into his activities tended to promote the rebirth of knowledge, which was accomplished in the period called the Renaissance. The labors of pople like Albertus Magnus were appreciated by Macaulay, who noticed them in one of the most famous chapters in literature:
     Whatever reproach may, at a later period, have been justly thrown on the indolence and lukury of religios orders, it was surely good that, in an age of ignorance and violence, there should be quiet cloisters and gardens, in which the arts of peace could be safely cultivated, in which gentle and contemplative natures could find an asylum, in which one brother could employ himself in transcribing the Aeneid of Virgil, and another in meditating the Analytics of Aristotle, in which he who had a genius for art might illuminate a martyrology or carve a crucifix, and in which he who had a turn for natural philosophy might make experiments on the properties of plants and minerals [The History of English from the Accession of James II, I, 9]
     Albertus Magnus is one of those personalities who are appreciated even by those whith a critical attitude towarsd the Catholic religion. For example, White, cofounder and first president of Cornell University, a declared enemy of dogmatic theology, had a sympathetic opinion of him:
First among these was Albert of Bollstädt, better known as Albert the Great, the most renowned scholar of his time. Fettered though he was by the methods sanctioned in the Church, dark as was all about him, he had conceived better methods and aims; his eye pierced the mists of scholasticism; he saw the light, and sought to draw the world toward it. He stands among the great pioneers of physical and natural science; he aided in giving foundations to botany and chemistry, he rose above his time, and struck a heavy blow on those who opposed the possibility of human life on the opposite sides of the earth; he noted the influence of mountains, seas, and forests upon races and products, so that Humboldt justly finds in his works the germs of physical geography as a comprehensive science [A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, I, 377].
The most recent biography of Albert, written on the occasion of the seven hundredth anniversary of his death, is by Weisheipl ["The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great". Albertus Magnus and the Sciences — Commemorative Essays].
     Albertus Magnus conceived and carried out the plan of commenting on all human knowledge by beginning with the natural sciences, proceeding to mathematics, and finishing in philosophy and theology. Thus, in his writings in the natural sciences, he refers to mathematics as the object of future activity:
     Primo complebimus, Deo adiuvante, scientiam naturalem, et deinde loquemur de mathematicis omnibus, et intentionem finiemus in scientia divina (Physica, Book I, Treatise 1, Chapter i).
     With God's help, we shall first complete natural science, and then we shall talk about all of mathematics, and we shall finish our program in divine science.

     Longum esset demonstrare, sed in geometria hoc docebitur et in astronomia, Domino concedente (Op. cit., I, 2, i).
     It would be long to prove, but, God willing, this will be taught in geometry and astronomy.

     Haec autem omnia supponenda sunt, probanda autem in libris de visu in Perspectivis, quae scientia compleri non potest, nisi primum consideremus ea quae pertinent ad geometriam (De Sensu et Sensato, Treatise 1, Chapter 14).
     All these things, however, must be supposed for now; they are to be proven, though, in the books on sight in Perspective, which science cannot be completed unless we shall first consider those things that pertain to geometry.
In his compositions on philosophy and theology, however, Albert refers to his work on geometry as at hing of the past, for he accepted the idea of Plato, that one could not competently study philosophy without having first mastered mathematics.
     Naturalibus et doctrinalibus iam, quantum licuit, scientiis elucidatis, iam ad veram philosophiae sapientiam accedamus (Metaphysica, Book I, Treatise I, Chapter i).
     Now that the natural and mathematical sciences have been elucidated as much as was possible, let us proceed to the true wisdom of philosophy.

     Hoc autem iam a nobis in geometricis est demonstratum (Ibid., I, 2, x).
     For this [sc. that the diameter and side of a square are incommensurable] has already been proven by us in the geometrical [works].

     Sicut in XV and XVI tertii geometriae nostrae demonstratum est (Ibid., III, 2, iii).
     Just as has been proven in the fifteenth and sixteenth [propositions] of the third [book] of our Geometry [sc. namely, that a tangent line to a circle intersects it at only one point].

     Sicut nos in I nostrae geometriae ostendimus (Ibid., V, 3, i).
     As we showed in the first [book] of our Geometry [sc., that two straight lines do not enclose a surface].

—Albertus Magnus on Euclid's Elements of Geometry, pgs. xi-xv

Here is St. Albertus Magnus's commentary on Euclid's famous proof of the Pythagorean Theorem, Proposition 46 here:

Friday, July 16, 2010

Galileo's Giant: Nicole Oresme

Nicole Oresme (c. 1320 - 1382) argued, a couple hundred years before Galileo, that a rotating earth is a simpler explanation than that of Ptolemy. He invented the coordinate system long before Descartes (1596-1650). He also investigated fractional powers and determined that the distance a freely falling body travels (x) is proportional to the square of the time (t) it has been traveling, viz., x = ½ g t², where g is the acceleration due to gravity. He used a slightly different notation, however, beginning in his first page of Algorismus proportionum:

From the first page of Oresme's Algorismus proportionum (fourteenth century)

The original Latin
The original Latin

An English translation of the Latin
An English translation of the Latin

—Cajori's A History of Mathematical Notation, Vol. 1 pgs. 91-93

From the excellent introductory physics textbook Physics for Realists (available here) by the M.I.T. and Princeton physicist Dr. Anthony Rizzi, founder of the Institute for Advanced Physics:

Nicole Oresme (o'rem) was born c. 1320 AD in Normandy, France, and died in 1382. He was, among other things, a mathematician, a physicist and a priest (made bishop of liseaux, France, in 1377). His major mathematical work is "Tractatus de Difformitatum." Among his accomplishments are the use of rectangular coordinates and graphing of the intensity of a quality then called latitudo (say, temperature of a rod), against a length then called longitudo (e.g., distance along the same rod), on such a rectangular coordinate system. He also discovered that speed versus time graphs can be constructed. Further, he investigated, in his own notation, fractional powers, saying 43/2 = 8.

In dynamics, he shows, following Jean Buridan [...], that the movement of the Earth is consistent with immediate experience, though it does not seem so at first. And, he points out that the movement of the Earth, not the geocentric hyothesis, is, indeed, the simpler one. These arguments we be employed by his successors, including Copernicus and Galileo.

He also made an argument for an international dateline. His argument fundamentally rests on noticing that only the relative motion of the earth and sun defines a conventional day (i.e., based on the rising and setting of the sun for a given observer). The principle can be understood by noting that if one moved fast enough to say "under" the sun, one would never experience a single conventional day. The roundness of the earth, which is also needed in the argument, was commonly assumed in the Middle Ages.

He proved, using graphical methods, the mean speed theorem [...] which Galileo imported into his work without reference. He determined the distance = ½ acceleration time² law for uniformly accelerated motion that was later applied by Fr. Dominic De Soto (1494-1560 [...]) to free falling objects.

—PFR pg. 48

A page from Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1505)

—"Nicole Oresme" in the MacTutor History of Mathematics archive: A page from Oresme's Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1505 reprint)

Could not have Oresme, being a theologian, progressed science and mathematics more had he not seemingly wasted his time becoming a Master of Theology at the University of Paris? The answer is no. Fr. Benedict Ashley, O.P.—a key contributer and reviewer of Physics for Realists—explains that philosophy, which includes mathematics and science, is a handmaiden of theology:

—Benedict Ashley, O.P.

True philosophy, the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, supports true theology, both of which demand a pursuit of truth. Mentioning the horrible state of the philosophy that Pope Pius XII condemned in Humani Generis, "Nouvelle Théologie" (New Theology)—which is opposed to true, scientific theology and definitely merits the stereotypes of theology being an irrational, unscientific discipline, proceeding haphazardly from from shaky first-principles and jumping to non sequitur conclusions, ignoring that parvus error in principio magnus est in fine ("a small error in principle is a big error in conclusion"), and ultimately upholding the relativism of truth, that it is based on the changing state of man—the great 20th century Thomistic philosopher Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., wrote that
no new definition of truth is offered in the new definition of theology: “Theology is no more than a spirituality or religious experience which found its intellectual expression.” And so follow assertions such as: “If theology can help us to understand spirituality, spirituality will, in the best of cases, cause our theological categories to burst, and we shall be obliged to formulate different types of theology…For each great spirituality corresponded to a great theology.” Does this mean that two theologies can be true, even if their main theses are contradictory and opposite? The answer will be no if one keeps to the traditional definition of truth. The answer will be yes if one adopts the new definition of truth, conceived not in relation to being and to immutable laws, but relative to different religious experiences. These definitions seek only to reconcile us to modernism.

It should be remembered that on December 1, 1924, the Holy Office condemned 12 propositions taken from the philosophy of action, among which was number 5, or the new definition of truth: “Truth is not found in any particular act of the intellect wherein conformity with the object would be had, as the Scholastics say, but rather truth is always in a state of becoming, and consists in a progressive alignment of the understanding with life, indeed a certain perpetual process, by which the intellect strives to develop and explain that which experience presents or action requires: by which principle, moreover, as in all progression, nothing is ever determined or fixed.” The last of these condemned propositions is: “Even after Faith has been received, man ought not to rest in the dogmas of religion, and hold fast to them fixedly and immovably, but always solicitous to remain moving ahead toward a deeper truth and even evolving into new notions, and even correcting that which he believes.”

Many, who did not heed these warnings, have now reverted to these errors.

—“Where is the New Theology Leading Us?” by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

Oresme did not fall into these errors. He studied true theology because he did true science.

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Science's Light Ages

One often hears today that everything before Galileo (1564-1642), including science, lived in the "Dark Ages" where people were unenlightened and apparently wasted their time studying theology. Yet Galileo was not alone; he indeed did "stand on the shoulders of giants." Who were some of them? What did they say? Certainly they were not theologians, or were they?

Besides Aristotle (382-322 B.C.), the first physicist, as mentioned before, there was St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), whose theory of time even today is mentioned in the quantum cosmology literature (e.g., in Rev. Mod. Phys. 61, 1 (1989) pg. 15). He said:
For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who even in thought can comprehend it, even to the pronouncing of a word concerning it? But what in speaking do we refer to more familiarly and knowingly than time? And certainly we understand when we speak of it; we understand also when we hear it spoken of by another. What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not; and the future is not as yet? But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, time truly it could not be, but eternity. If, then, time present—if it be time—only comes into existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be—namely, so that we cannot truly say that time is, unless because it tends not to be?

—St. Augustine's Confessions XI, ch. 14


Much later (1225-1274) St. Thomas Aquinas unified Greek, principally Aristotelean, thought with that of Christendom. Some of his scientific contributions were to describe the
  1. relation of mathematics to the natural sciences,
  2. relativity of locomotion,
  3. nature of light in optics,
  4. motion of falling bodies, and
  5. foundations of the modern, Galileo-like scientific method,
among many other things.

1. Relation of Mathematics to Natural Sciences

St. Thomas commented on question V of Boethius's De Trinitate, saying:

By its very nature motion is not in the category of quantity, but it partakes somewhat of the nature of quantity from another source, namely, according as the division of motion derives from either the division of space or the division of the thing subject to motion. So it does not belong to the mathematician to treat of motion, although mathematical principles can be applied to motion. Therefore, inasmuch as the principles of quantity are applied to motion, the natural scientist treats of the division and continuity of motion, as is clear in the Physics. And the measurements of motions are studied in the intermediate sciences between mathematics and natural science: for instance, in the science of the moved sphere and in astronomy.

Simple bodies and their properties remain in composite bodies although in a different way, as the proper qualities of the elements and their proper movements are found in a mixed body. What is proper to composite bodies, however, is not found in simple bodies. And so it is that the more abstract and simple the objects of a science are, the more applicable its principles are to the other sciences. Thus the principles of mathematics are applicable to natural things, but not visa versa, because physics presupposes mathematics; but the converse is not true, as is clear in the De Caelo et Mundo. So there are three levels of sciences concerning natural and mathematical entities. Some are purely natural and treat of the properties of natural things as such, like physics, agriculture, and the like. Others are purely mathematical and treat of quantities absolutely, as geometry considers magnitude and arithmetic numbers. Still others are intermediate, and these apply mathematical principles to natural things; for instance, music, astronomy, and the like. These sciences, however, have a closer affinity to mathematics, because in their thinking that which is physical is, as it were, material, whereas that which is mathematical is, as it were, formal. For example, music considers sounds, not inasmuch as they are sounds, but inasmuch as they are proportionable according to numbers; and the same holds in other sciences. Thus they demonstrate their conclusions concerning natural things, but by means of mathematics. Therefore nothing prevents their being concerned with sensible matter insofar as they have something in common with natural science, but insofar as they have something in common with mathematics they are abstract.

—In Boethium De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3 ad 5 et ad 6

Commenting on Aristotle's Physics 193b22, St. Thomas also wrote:

161. Next where he says, ‘That is why he separates ...’(193 b 33), he concludes to a sort of corollary from what he has just said. Because the mathematician does not consider lines, and points, and surfaces, and things of this sort, and their accidents, insofar as they are the boundaries of a natural body, he is said to abstract from sensible and natural matter. And the reason why he is able to abstract is this: according to the intellect these things are abstracted from motion.

As evidence for this reason we must note that many things are joined in the thing, but the understanding of one of them is not derived from the understanding of another. Thus white and musical are joined in the same subject, nevertheless the understanding of one of these is not derived from an understanding of the other. And so one can be separately understood without the other. And this one is understood as abstracted from the other. It is clear, however, that the posterior is not derived from the understanding of the prior, but conversely. Hence the prior can be understood without the posterior, but not conversely. Thus it is clear that animal is prior to man, and man is prior to this man (for man is had by addition to animal, and this man by addition to man). And because of this our understanding of man is not derived from our understanding of animal, nor our understanding of Socrates from our understanding of man. Hence animal can be understood without man, and man without Socrates and other individuals. And this is to abstract the universal from the particular.

In like manner, among all the accidents which come to substance, quantity comes first, and then the sensible qualities, and actions and passions, and the motions consequent upon sensible qualities. Therefore quantity does not embrace in its intelligibility the sensible qualities or the passions or the motions. Yet it does include substance in its intelligibility. Therefore quantity can be understood without matter, which is subject to motion, and without sensible qualities, but not without substance. And thus quantities and those things which belong to them are understood as abstracted from motion and sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter, as is said in Metaphysics, VII:10.

Since, therefore, the objects of mathematics are abstracted from motion according to the intellect, and since they do not include in their intelligibility sensible matter, which is a subject of motion, the mathematician can abstract them from sensible matter. And it makes no difference as far as the truth is concerned whether they are considered one way or the other. For although the objects of mathematics are not separated according to existence, the mathematicians, in abstracting them according to their understanding, do not lie, because they do not assert that these things exist apart from sensible matter (for this would be a lie). But they consider them without any consideration of sensible matter, which can be done without lying. Thus one can truly consider the white without the musical, even though they exist together in the same subject. But it would not be a true consideration if one were to assert that the white is not musical.

162. Next where he says, “The holders of the theory...’ (193 b 35), he excludes from what he has said an error of Plato.

Since Plato was puzzled as to how the intellect could truly separate those things which were not separated in their existence, he held that all things which are separated in the understanding are separated in the thing. Hence he not only held that mathematical entities are separated, because of the fact that the mathematician abstracts from sensible matter, but he even held that natural things themselves are separated, because of the fact that natural science is of universals and not of singulars. Hence he held that man is separated, and horse, and stone, and other such things. And he said these separated things are ideas, although natural things are less abstract than mathematical entities. For mathematical entities are altogether separated from sensible matter in the understanding, because sensible matter is not included in the understanding of the mathematicals, neither in the universal nor in the particular. But sensible matter is included in the understanding of natural things, whereas individual matter is not. For in the understanding of man flesh and bone is included, but not this flesh and this bone.

163. Next where he says, ‘This becomes plain ...’ (194 a 1), he clarifies the solution he has given in two ways, first by means of the difference in the definitions which the mathematician and the natural philosopher assign, and secondly by means of the intermediate sciences, where he says, ‘Similar evidence ...’ (194 a 7 #164).

He says, therefore, first that what has been said of the different modes of consideration of the mathematician and the natural philosopher will become evident if one attempts to give definitions of the mathematicals, and of natural things and of their accidents. For the mathematicals, such as equal and unequal, straight and curved, and number, and line, and figure, are defined without motion and matter, but this is not so with flesh and bone and man. Rather the definition of these latter is like the definition of the snub in which definition a sensible subject is placed, i.e., nose. But this is not the case with the definition of the curved in which definition a sensible subject is not placed.

And thus from the very definitions of natural things and of the mathematicals, what was said above [#160ff] about the difference between the mathematician and the natural philosopher is apparent.

164. Next where he says, ‘Similar evidence...’ (194 a 7), he proves the same thing by means of those sciences which are intermediates between mathematics and natural philosophy.

Those sciences are called intermediate sciences which take principles abstracted by the purely mathematical sciences and apply them to sensible matter. For example, perspective applies to the visual line those things which are demonstrated by geometry about the abstracted line; and harmony, that is music, applies to sound those things which arithmetic considers about the proportions of numbers; and astronomy applies the consideration of geometry and arithmetic to the heavens and its parts.

However, although sciences of this sort are intermediates between natural science and mathematics, they are here said by the Philosopher to be more natural than mathematical, because each thing is named and takes its species from its terminus. Hence, since the consideration of these sciences is terminated in natural matter, then even though they proceed by mathematical principles, they are more natural than mathematical sciences.

He says, therefore, that sciences of this sort are established in a way contrary to the sciences which are purely mathematical, such as geometry or arithmetic. For geometry considers the line which has existence in sensible matter, which is the natural line. But it does not consider it insofar as it is in sensible matter, insofar as it is natural, but abstractly, as was said [#160ff]. But perspective conversely takes the abstract line which is in the consideration of mathematics, and applies it to sensible matter, and thus treats it not insofar as it is a mathematical, but insofar as it is a physical thing.

Therefore from this difference between intermediate sciences and the purely mathematical sciences, what was said above is clear. For if intermediate sciences of this sort apply the abstract to sensible matter, it is clear that mathematics conversely separates those things which are in sensible matter.

165. And from this it is clear what his answer is to the objection raised above [#158] concerning astronomy. For astronomy is a natural science more than a mathematical science. Hence it is no wonder that astronomy agrees in its conclusions with natural science.

However, since it is not a purely natural science, it demonstrates the same conclusion through another method. Thus, the fact that the earth is spherical is demonstrated by natural science by a natural method, e.g., because its parts everywhere and equally come together at the middle. But this is demonstrated by astronomy from the figure of the lunar eclipse, or from the fact that the same stars are not seen from every part of the earth.

—In II Phys. lect. 3, nn. 5-9

He also mentioned in his Summa Theologica that:

As stated above (Question 1, Article 1), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."

—II-II, q. 9, a. 2 ad 3

2. Relativity of Locomotion

Commenting on Aristotle's De Cælo II., St. Thomas preceded Galilean relativity by writing:

396. First he considers the first one [297], and says that it is impossible that both, i.e., the star and its orb, be at rest if we assume that the earth is also at rest. For the apparent motion of the stars cannot be saved if both the stars which appear to be in motion are at rest, and the men who see them. For, that motion should appear, this must be caused either by the motion of the thing seen or of the one seeing. For this reason, some, positing the stars and the whole heaven to be at rest, posited the earth on which we live to be moved from west to east around the equinoxial poles [i.e., its axis] once a day. According to this, it is due to our own motion that the stars seem to move in a contrary direction. This is said to have been the opinion of Heraclitus of Pontus and Aristarchus. However, Aristotle is supposing for the present that the earth is at rest —which fact he will later prove. Hence it remains, the first member, in which the heaven and the stars were assumed to be at rest, having been set aside, to verify one of the two others —namely, that stating that both, i.e., the star and the orb, are in motion, or that stating one to be in motion and the other at rest.

—In II De Cælo, lect. 11, n. 2

405. Then he shows that the motion seen in the stars is due to neither of these two motions. First he shows that the motion seen in the stars is not one of circumgyration; and he proves this in two ways. First, because if the stellar bodies were being moved with the motion of circumgyration, then, even though the parts of the star exchanged places as to subject, the star as a whole would have to remain in the same place as to subject, the place being varied only according to notion, as is clear from what was proved in Physics VI. For that is the way things turn out for a spherical motion due to its relation to a center and to poles that are stationary. But we cannot admit such a situation in the stars, since the contrary is evident to sense —for we see stars sometimes in the east and sometimes in the west. Likewise, everyone says that the stars do not remain always in the same place but are transferred from one place to another. Therefore, the motion that appears to be in the stars is not one of circumgyration.

—In II De Cælo, lect. 12, n. 4

3. Nature of Light in Optics

Commenting on Aristotle's De Anima II., St. Thomas wrote this about light, which is reminiscent of field of view or the inverse square law in optics:

§ 433. [...] For if anything is to be seen it must actually affect the organ of sight. Now it has been shown that this organ as such is not affected by an immediate object—such as an object placed upon the eye. So there must be a medium between organ and object. But a vacuum is not a medium; it cannot receive or transmit effects from the object. Hence through a vacuum nothing would be seen at all.

§ 434. Democritus went wrong because he thought that the reason why distance diminishes visibility was that the medium is of itself an impediment to the action of the visible object upon sight. But it is not so. The transparent medium as such is not in the least incompatible with luminosity or colour; on the contrary, it is proximately disposed to their reception; a sign of which is that it is illumined or coloured instantaneously. The real reason why distance diminishes visibility, is that everything seen is seen within the angle of a triangle, or rather pyramid, whose base is the object seen and apex in the eye that sees.

§ 435. It makes no difference whether seeing takes place by a movement from the eye outwards, so that the lines enclosing the triangle or pyramid run from the eye to the object, or e converso, so long as seeing does involve this triangular or pyramidal figure; which is necessary because, since the object is larger than the pupil of the eye, its effect upon the medium has to be scaled down gradually until it reaches the eye. And, obviously, the longer are the sides of a triangle or pyramid the smaller is the angle at the apex, provided that the base remains the same. The further away, then, is the object, the less does it appear—until at a certain distance it cannot be seen at all.

—In II De Anima lect. 15, §433-§435

Long before the Italian physicist Macedonio Melloni (1798-1854) discovered that heat and light share similar properties, St. Thomas wrote this:
[L]ux [...] semper est effectiva caloris; etiam lux lunæ. ["Light always is effected of heat; even moonlight."]

—Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 15 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5

4. Motion of Falling Bodies

Previously, many adopted Aristotle's theory that the medium—e.g., air—is what keeps a falling object in motion. Commenting on Aristotle's Physics III., St. Thomas distinguished for the first time these three things: weight, mass, and the resisting medium:

535. [...] This resistance can arise from three sources: First, from the situs of the mobile; for from the very fact that the mover intends to transfer the mobile to some certain place, the mobile, existing in some other place, resists the intention of the mover. Secondly, from the nature of the mobile, as is evident in compulsory motions, as when a heavy object is thrown upwards. Thirdly, from the medium. All three are taken together as one resistance, to constitute one cause of slowing up in the motion. Therefore when the mobile, considered in isolation as different from the mover, is a being in act, the resistance of the mobile to the mover can be traced either to the mobile only, as happens in the heavenly bodies, or to the mobile and medium together, as happens in the case of animate bodies on this earth. But in heavy and light objects, if you take away what the mobile receives from the mover, viz., the form which is the principle of motion given by the generator, i.e., by the mover, nothing remains but the matter which can offer no resistance to the mover. Hence in light and heavy objects the only source of resistance is the medium. Consequently, in heavenly bodies differences in velocity arise only on account of the ratio between mover and mobile; in animate bodies from the proportion of the mover to the mobile and to the resisting medium—both together. And it is in these latter cases that the given objection would have effect, viz., that if you remove the slowing up caused by the impeding medium, there still remains a definite amount of time in the motion, according to the proportion of the mover to the mobile. But in heavy and light bodies, there can be no slowing up of speed, except what the resistance of the medium causes—and in such cases Aristotle’s argument applies.

—In IV Physica lect. 12, n. 535

5. Foundations of the Modern Scientific Method

Commenting on Aristotle's De Cælo II., St. Thomas notes that there can be multiple theories explaining given observations:
Yet it is not necessary that the various suppositions which [the astronomers] hit upon be true—for although these suppositions save the appearances, we are nevertheless not obliged to say that these suppositions are true, because perhaps there is some other way men have not yet grasped by which the things which appear as to the stars are saved.

—In II De cælo, lect. 17, n. 451

Similarly, St. Thomas writes, when considering whether one can know the Trinity by natural means:

Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. [...]

—Summa Theologica, I, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2


Following St. Thomas Aquinas came these people:
Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253) did experiments (not yet of course with modern rigor) and was keen on using mathematics; he is known for his work on understanding the rainbow. Thomas of Bradwardine (c. 1295-1349) at Merton College Oxford introduced the distinction between mean velocity (x/t) and instantaneous velocity (dx/dt) [and he was the first to write a physics equation]. Bradwardine had an enthusiasm for empiriometric physics that started a whole school called the Merton school (his successors include: William Heytesbury, Richard Swineshead, and John Dumbleton) that was extremely influential throughout Europe. Among other things, they were known for the Merton mean speed theorem, by which they proved the correct formula for free fall distance was given by s=1/2 a t². Interestingly, both Bradwardine and Grosseteste at some point in their lives were Archbishops of Canterbury. Nicole Oresme (<1348-1382) and Giovanni di Casali (c. 1350) independently developed use of 2-D graphs [long before Descartes (1596-1650)]. Oresme described all change using these graphs in particular local motion, including calculating area (integrating) under velocity curves to get distance. Oresme's arguments for the sun-centered and moving earth were widely known: he said, for example, that "...not only is the earth so moved diurnally, but with it the water and the air, as was said, in such a way that the water and the lower air are moved differently than they are by winds and other causes. It is like this situation If air were enclosed in a moving ship, it would seem to the person situated in this air that it was not moved." (p. 133, Dales.)

—A. Rizzi's Science Before Science pgs. 199-200

Roger Bacon (1214-1294) advocated mathematics in the experimental sciences:
The neglect [of mathematics] for the past thirty or forty years has nearly destroyed the entire learning of Latin Christendom. For he who does not know mathematics cannot know any of the other sciences.

—Opus maius IV.1.1. (ed. J.H. Bridges [Oxford 1897], I, 97-98)

Quantity is the first property of anything, so to neglect that would indeed be to miss a lot. St. Thomas said that mathematics is most connatural to man, hence its development—not the introduction of experimentation, which already existed—was what has driven the scientific boom in the past 400 years. Card. Thomas of Bradwardine said this about mathematics in the sciences:
[Mathematics] reveals every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to study physics while neglecting mathematics, should know from the start that he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom.

—Tractatus de continuo MS Erfurt Amplon Q.385, fol. 31v.