Showing posts with label relativism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label relativism. Show all posts

Sunday, June 24, 2012

Pragmatism or Realism?

Realism opposes a relativism of truth and upholds absolute truth. Realism says that truth is the "adequation of intellect and thing." Pragmatism says something is true insofar as it is useful. While utility might be a sign that something is true, as, e.g., the usefulness of Newtonian mechanics in inventing new technologies is a sign that it is a true explanation of the natural world, utility does not necessitate it to be true, for there might be radically different yet accurate explanations of the natural world, like quantum mechanics, which employs a completely different conceptual and philosophical framework than Newtonian mechanics.

Why must scientists return to a realist and not pragmatist definition of truth? Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., a correspondent with the French physicist Pierre Duhem, proves that a realistic definition of truth opens one up to lines of reasoning inaccessible with a pragmatist definition of truth:
In sciences, physical and physico-mathematical, those facts which exist independently of our mind are considered certain, as laws which express constant relations among phenomena. Postulates, hypotheses, are defined by their relation to the truth to be attained, not as yet accessible or certain. To illustrate. On the principle of inertia, many scientists hold that inertia in repose is certain, meaning that a body not acted upon by an exterior cause remains in repose. But others, H. Poincare, for example, or P. Duhem, see in this view a mere postulate suggested by our experience with inertia in movement, which means that "a body already in motion, if no exterior cause acts upon it, retains indefinitely its motion, rectilinear and uniform." Experience suggests this view, because as obstacles diminish, the more is motion prolonged, and because "a constant force, acting on a material point entirely free, impresses on it a motion uniformly accelerated," as is the motion of a falling body. But the second formula of inertia, as applied to a body in repose, is not certain, because, as Poincare [La science et l'hypothese, pp. 112-19. of French original] says: "No one has ever experimented on a body screened from the influence of every force, or, if he has, how could he know that the body was thus screened?" The influence of a force may remain imperceptible.

Inertia in repose, then, remains a postulate, a proposition, that is, which is not self-evident, which cannot be proved either a priori or a posteriori, but which the scientist accepts in default of any other principle. The scientist, says P. Duhem, has no right to say that the principle is true, but neither has he the right to say it is false, since no phenomenon has so far constrained us to construct a physical theory which would exclude this principle. It is retained, so far, as guide in classifying phenomena. This line of argument renders homage to the objective notion of truth. We could not reason thus under truth's pragmatic definition.
Reality Chapter 57: Realism And Pragmatism, III. Pragmatic Consequences

Sunday, September 11, 2011

Relatively Relativist

From a real conversation at 1 min. 20 sec. into the video:
"Why is natural law and homosexuality relative? It's completely self-evident."
"You want me to become a relativist. I don't want to become a relativist."
"No, I don't even agree with the fact that you're saying I'm a relativist."
"So you're relatively relativist?"
"Yeah."

Cf. Searle's "Refutation of Relativism."

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Existentialism Yields False Science

[...] when a learned man is presented with any statement in an ancient author, the one question he never asks is whether it is true. He asks who influenced the ancient writer, and how far the statement is consistent with what he said in other books, and what phase in the writer's development, or in the general history of thought, it illustrates, and how it affected other writers.

—C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters

Is this how we perceive the writings of ancient scientists? In their historical context? Were they not striving to attain an absolute truth about the universe, or only a truth bound-up in the milieu of their era and Kuhnian paradigms? The latter would be true if one adopted the philosophy of evolutionism, viz., as Sartre said in his Existentialism is a Humanism lecture, "that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards," irrespective of a guiding authority for judging truth. This conception of man is untrue since we do not invent truth and arbitrarily assign it a meaning ourselves; an objective, unchanging Reality exists outside ourselves in which is unified all truth into an infinitely simple Unity. This Reality is God, and only God gives us our meaning and dignity.

Four years after Sartre's lecture, Pope Pius XII wrote Humani Generis saying this about existentialism and how it leads to "false science":
Such fictitious tenets of evolution which repudiate all that is absolute, firm and immutable, have paved the way for the new erroneous philosophy which, rivaling idealism, immanentism and pragmatism, has assumed the name of existentialism, since it concerns itself only with existence of individual things and neglects all consideration of their immutable essences. [...] [The] Teaching Authority [of the Church] is represented by them [e.g., the existentialists] as a hindrance to progress and an obstacle in the way of science. [...] [And] [t]hese and like errors, it is clear, have crept in among certain of Our sons who are deceived by imprudent zeal for souls or by false science.
So, existentialism "concerns itself only with existence of individual things and neglects all consideration of their immutable essences." What scientists would reject, e.g., that the fundamental nature of proton seconds after the Big Bang is entirely different than it is now? Sure, physical constants could change over time, but unless there is some immutable kernel—such as the rational soul is for a human—you cannot have a coherent understanding of nature thus neither a coherent science. A proton a thousand years ago could be what we now call a unicorn.

Maintaining Catholic values amidst a culture so opposed to these values is the biggest challenge today facing not only scientists but everyone. Myriads of conflicting ideologies inundate us, and existentialists see the Catholic faith as just one of many seemingly equally true belief systems that man invented. Yet, man did not invent the Catholic Church, the most trustworthy, true, and immutable religion. God Himself, the immutable Word Incarnate, founded it out of love for us. Thus, the Catholic faith is a steady rock in the torrential sea of ideologies on which we can find hope, deepen our faith, and ultimately be charitable to both neighbor and God.

Those who seek a "Grand Unified Theory" of the universe ultimately seek to know God, who "became all things to all men" (1 Cor. 9:22) to "give testimony to the truth" (Jn. 18:37) so we can "have the unction from the Holy One, and know all things." (1 Jn. 2:20).

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Truth

What is truth? Quid est veritas? (John 18:38). This is the ultimate question all scientists must pursue, but before discussing why a univocal truth no longer appears as the aim of modern universities and research institutions, let us define truth more precisely.
The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4), "The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect." [...] [T]ruth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.

St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica Iª q. 16 a. 1 s.c. & co.

If our intellect conforms to reality, then one says this is truth. To find truth, then, we need to apply our intellects to understand everything; this is research. But if truth resides in the intellect, does not this imply a plurality of truths, one for each scientist's understanding of a thing? Does not this imply a relativism of truth? How can scientists, then, come to a consensus—not democratically by majority rule, however—about the truth of, say, a hydrogen atom? Here is this objection, viz., to the fact that the truth is in the intellect:
[W]hatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

ibid. Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2

To which St. Thomas replies by invoking the divine intellect, the intellect of God who is Truth Itself (John 14:6):
The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv, 5ff.). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

ibid. Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 2

We can see that if "natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance" as the atheistic Darwinists think, then truth is only relative to each particular person's understanding of a natural thing. There would be no scientific consensus nor understanding. Science would be doomed. Yet there is hope.
As said above (Article 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

ibid. Iª q. 16 a. 5 co.

Therefore, in order to avoid a cacophony of truths, we must "say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect." This is why theology, the study of God, is the supreme science (ibid. Iª q. 1 a. 5 s. c.) with metaphysics and the other sciences being her handmaidens. So why does absolute truth no longer appear as the aim of modern universities and research institutions? The simple reasons are that most (1) deny the Ultimate Truth, God; (2) conceive academic freedom as an aimless free-inquiry; and (3) unquestioningly uphold as dogma the relativism of truth. "For to seek the truth [and understanding today] [...] [is] to follow flying game," as Aristotle says in Metaphysics IV, 5, 1009b40. It does not have to be this way.

Sunday, October 4, 2009

Reason & Faith: Double-Truths?

Averroes, the prominent Islamic philosopher who said "I necessarily conclude through reason that the intellect is one in number; but I firmly hold the opposite through faith," thought that scientific truths are completely separate from and can even contradict truths not based on human reason, such as truths divinely revealed. This would seem to give science more academic freedom, being apparently unencumbered by seemingly unnecessary religious dogma. But the Islamic philosophy's decoupling of reason from religion and upholding a "double-truth" is a false philosophy with dangerous, irrational consequences, e.g., radical fundamentalism. However, science and the Catholic faith are compatible, as St. Thomas Aquinas's writings, the basis of Catholic philosophy, establish. In his De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas ("On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists"), the thirteenth-century St. Thomas refutes Averroes's denial of the individuality of the human intellect:
Just as all men naturally desire to know the truth [Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1, 980a], so there is inherent in men a natural desire to avoid errors, and refute them when they are able to do so. Now among other errors, the error that seems especially inappropriate is the one concerning that very intellect through which we are meant by nature to avoid errors and know the truth. For a long time now there has been spreading among many people an error concerning the intellect, arising from the words of Averroes. He tries to assert that the intellect that Aristotle calls the possible intellect [Aristotle, De Anima III, 4, 429a 18-24], but that he himself calls by the unsuitable name "material," is a substance separate in its being from the body and not united to it in some way as its form, and furthermore that this possible intellect is one for all men. Against these views we have already written many things in the past [e.g., Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 1 & 2]. But because the boldness of those who err has not ceased to strive against the truth, we will try again to write something against this same error to refute it clearly. It is not now our intention to show that the above-mentioned position is erroneous in this, that it is opposed to the truth of the Christian Faith. For this can easily enough become evident to everyone. For if we deny to men a diversity of the intellect, which alone among the parts of the soul seems to be incorruptible and immortal, it follows that after death nothing of the souls of men would remain except that single substance of intellect; and so the recompense of rewards and punishments and also their diversity would be destroyed. However, we intend to show that the above-mentioned position is no less against the principles of philosophy than against the teachings of Faith. And because, so they say, the words of the Latins on this subject have no savor for some persons, but these men say that they follow the words of the Peripatetics, whose books on this subject they have never seen, except those of Aristotle who was the founder of the Peripatetic Sect; we shall show first that the above-mentioned position is entirely opposed to his words and meaning.

De unitate intellectus, pr.

Nowhere can the Catholic faith contradict true science or vice versa, even though there have been many accusations: (1) that of the Galileo affair, which was due to the fact that, unlike Copernicus, Galileo asserted his theory as absolutely true and not simply as a scientific theory subject to possible error, or (2) that the Church disapproves of the scientific theory of biological evolution, which is untrue; for according to Denzinger's 1911 edition of his collection of Catholic dogma, Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum, the First Vatican Council states:
1797 [The impossibility of opposition between faith and reason]. But, although faith is above reason, nevertheless, between faith and reason no true dissension can ever exist, since the same God, who reveals mysteries and infuses faith, has bestowed on the human soul the light of reason; moreover, God cannot deny Himself, nor ever contradict truth with truth. But, a vain appearance of such a contradiction arises chiefly from this, that either the dogmas of faith have not been understood and interpreted according to the mind of the Church, or deceitful opinions are considered as the determinations of reason. Therefore, "every assertion contrary to the truth illuminated by faith, we define to be altogether false" [Lateran Council V, see n. 738]. 1798 Further, the Church which, together with the apostolic duty of teaching, has received the command to guard the deposit of faith, has also, from divine Providence, the right and duty of proscribing "knowledge falsely so called" [1 Tim. 6:20], "lest anyone be cheated by philosophy and vain deceit" [cf. Col. 2:8; can. 2]. Wherefore, all faithful Christians not only are forbidden to defend opinions of this sort, which are known to be contrary to the teaching of faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, as the legitimate conclusions of science, but they shall be altogether bound to hold them rather as errors, which present a false appearance of truth. 1799 [The mutual assistance of faith and reason, and the just freedom of science]. And, not only can faith and reason never be at variance with one another, but they also bring mutual help to each other, since right reasoning demonstrates the basis of faith and, illumined by its light, perfects the knowledge of divine things, while faith frees and protects reason from errors and provides it with manifold knowledge. Wherefore, the Church is so far from objecting to the culture of the human arts and sciences, that it aids and promotes this cultivation in many ways. For, it is not ignorant of, nor does it despise the advantages flowing therefrom into human life; nay, it confesses that, just as they have come forth from "God, the Lord of knowledge" [1 Samuel 2:3], so, if rightly handled, they lead to God by the aid of His grace. And it (the Church) does not forbid disciplines of this kind, each in its own sphere, to use its own principles and its own method; but, although recognizing this freedom, it continually warns them not to fall into errors by opposition to divine doctrine, nor, having transgressed their own proper limits, to be busy with and to disturb those matters which belong to faith.
Before a scientist might judge this as the Church's apparently being threatened by science and desperately trying to keep it "in its place," note what St. Thomas Aquinas says:
[T]he argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest.

Summa Theologica Iª q. 1 a. 8 ad 2

It would seem this is untrue because correct interpretation of divine revelation is difficult and subject to human error and speculation. But that human reason is subject to error is precisely the point; authority based on human reason is like building a house on sand. Compared to divine authority—authority based on the solid foundation of something most perfect, powerful, and immutable, i.e., absolute truth itself—human reason is unstable, changing, fleeting, and restrained by time. Therefore, "the argument from authority based on divine revelation is [indeed] the strongest;" and consequently science, with its roots in a true philosophy (i.e., Scholastic Thomism) that does not contradict divine revelation nor human reason but strives to understand a single absolute truth, is even stronger. This is true science.

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

False Philosophies ☯ Ruin Science

What is wrong with these philosophies?
Evil is good because without evil there would be no good. Similarly, good is evil because without good there would be no evil. Therefore, evil is good, and good is evil. Consequently, if God exists, God as the supreme good is also God of the supreme evil, and worshippers of God worship both good and evil or neither good nor evil at all. Why prefer good to evil instead of evil to good if they are really the same?
Arbitrarily substituting "good" for "truth" and "evil" for "falsity" yields an equivalent argument with which many modern scientists might agree:
Falsity is truth because without falsity there would be no truth. Similarly, truth is falsity because without truth there would be no falsity. Therefore, falsity is truth, and truth is falsity. Consequently, if God exists, God as the supreme truth is also God of the supreme falsity, and worshippers of God worship both truth and falsity or neither truth nor falsity at all. Why prefer truth to falsity instead of falsity to truth if they are really the same?
Here is another:
God's command "Thou shalt not steal" (Exod. 20:13) is meaningless since if, for example, I steal my neighbor's thing, I am not really stealing but rather giving him the gift of an anti-thing. If I give him the thing instead, then I am stealing his anti-thing.
All these arguments proceed from the atheistic philosophy of the relativism of truth, namely that everything obtains its meaning solely from an interdependence on everything else rather than from a dependence ultimately on God. "Good," "truth," and "thing" do not depend for their existence upon "evil," "falsity," or "anti-thing," respectively, because good is a lack of evil, falsity is a lack of truth, and "anti-thing" is the lack of "thing" (cf. Einstein's professor). What kind of physics, for example, do we have if it be based on such a false, yin-yang–like philosophy as relativism? What does it profit us to question why, e.g., good does not depend on evil? Yes, there are such things as futile questions (cf. Job 38), for example: Why does 2 + 2 = 4? Therefore, we must submit ourselves, before we lead ourselves astray, to the guiding principles of the truest philosophy: Scholasticism.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Academic Freedom

Many still believe today, due to a nineteenth century myth that the Church is at war with science, "that the uncritical acceptance of religious doctrine not only inhibits, but even destroys the life of intelligence," yet
inasmuch as this conception of intellectual and academic freedom is based on the principle of free inquiry—i.e. the position that every doctrine is subject to critical examination and possible rejection—it is suitable (and hardly unfair) to examine critically the general principle itself. If it claims to be a dogma, the only dogma immune to criticism, by what right does it claim its exemption from the general principle? Or, on the other hand, if it too is open to question, by what principle are we to justify our examination of it? Not by the principle of free inquiry, for it is presently under judgment and therefore in suspense. [...] A further difficulty is that the principle of free inquiry would be nullified by the achievement of its stated purpose. As long as a man is ignorant, it is consistent with his condition to remain open to both the affirmative and negative answers to the issue in question. But when and if he comes to know (which is the purpose of his investigation) the matter ceases to be doubtful to him, and his mind closes to the possibility that the opposite might be true. He is no longer free to doubt, except willfully. Thus by the assumed definition ignorance makes free, while knowledge enslaves. A reply to this objection might assume that knowledge is simply unattainable, inasmuch as all things are in all respects always changing, or inasmuch as our minds, not being omniscient, cannot reach the certain truth about anything. But this, as before, would base the principle of free inquiry on particular and controversial philosophical theories, which as a consequence would be immune to criticism under the principle.

St. Thomas Aquinas College Founding Document: III. Academic Freedom

This mirrors the argument against the relativism of truth, and indeed many universities no longer consider science the pursuit of an absolute truth nor do they submit themselves to any absolute authority, except maybe the self-contradicting dogma of free inquiry and endless argument-forming. According to the notable historians of science David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers,
The notion that any serious Christian thinker would even have attempted to formulate a world view from the Bible alone is ludicrous. For example, contrary to popular belief (which White's [A History of the] Warfare [of Science with Theology in Christendom] has helped to shape), the church did not insist on a flat earth; there was scarcely a Christian scholar of the Middle Ages who did not acknowledge its sphericity and even know its approximate circumference. [...] Galileo argued that God spoke through both scripture and the "book of nature," that the two could not truly conflict, and that in physical matters authority should rest with reason and sense. [...] Galileo never questioned the authority of scripture, merely the principles by which it was to be interpreted. [...] It was not a matter of Christianity waging war on science. All of the participants called themselves Christians, and all acknowledged biblical authority.

Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 39.3:140-149 (9/1987)

Why did scientists submit themselves to an authority? They recognized that academic freedom is not the aimless and chaotic but directed and ordered pursuit of truth. This direction and order originates from the wisdom, laws, doctrines, and dogma of the Church, ultimately from the authoritative founder of the Church, Christ Himself, Who said "I am the way, and the truth, and the life. [...] And you shall know the truth: and the truth shall make you free." (John 14:6, 8:32).
These words contain both a fundamental requirement and a warning: the requirement of an honest relationship with regard to truth as a condition for authentic freedom, and the warning to avoid every kind of illusory freedom, every superficial unilateral freedom, every freedom that fails to enter into the whole truth about man and the world. Today also, even after two thousand years, we see Christ as the one who brings man freedom based on truth, frees man from what curtails, diminishes and as it were breaks off this freedom at its root, in man's soul, his heart and his conscience.

—Pope John Paul II Redemptor Hominis 12.

Monday, August 17, 2009

Godless Human Reason and the One True Church

Pope Pius IX's encyclical Quanta Cura condemns "naturalism" or the "liberty of perdition," specifically paragraph 2 of section 3 which includes a condemnation of this:
liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way.
He continues by asserting it is not just religious freedom that is the problem but also the worship of human reason, which is something very prevalent at universities:
But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching "liberty of perdition;" and that "if human arguments are always allowed free room for discussion, there will never be wanting men who will dare to resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of human wisdom; whereas we know, from the very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how carefully Christian faith and wisdom should avoid this most injurious babbling."
His Syllabus of Errors, which accompanies the encyclical, condemns indifferentist and latitudinarian propositions which deny the absolute truthfulness of only the Catholic Church:
III. INDIFFERENTISM, LATITUDINARIANISM
  1. Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true. —Allocution "Maxima quidem," June 9, 1862; Damnatio "Multiplices inter," June 10, 1851.
  2. Man may, in the observance of any religion whatever, find the way of eternal salvation, and arrive at eternal salvation. —Encyclical "Qui pluribus," Nov. 9, 1846.
  3. Good hope at least is to be entertained of the eternal salvation of all those who are not at all in the true Church of Christ. —Encyclical "Quanto conficiamur," Aug. 10, 1863, etc.
  4. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian religion, in which form it is given to please God equally as in the Catholic Church. —Encyclical "Noscitis," Dec. 8, 1849.
However, Pope Pius IX's encyclical and Syllabus seem to contradict the Vatican II document Dignitatis Humanæ, which is subtitled in seeming direct contradiction to condemnations of "religious freedom" (i.e., "Declaration on Religious Freedom — On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious Promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965"). Although one cannot deny the Vatican II council's authority, it seems that Dignitatis Humanæ advocates separation of Church and state, relativism, humanism (i.e., a trust in human reason without the Church and the Catholic faith as its guide), the inutility of the Church in salvation, and the subjection of the Church to state, among other things. Yet it does not. Its audience is the world, including non-Catholics; and its message is that the Church does not and will not force converts. Nevertheless, the Catholic faith is still the only true one (Dominus Iesus).

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

True Science

Natural science and the Catholic faith have two different ends, although they are not mutually exclusive. One is to understand the physical world, God's creation, and the other is to know God directly. St. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval doctor of the Church whose best works treat the relationship between science and faith, says in his Summa Theologica Iª q. 1 a. 5 s. c., in response to the question "Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?", that "Other sciences [e.g., the natural sciences] are called the handmaidens of this one [i.e., theology, sacred doctrine]: 'Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower' (Prov. 9:3)." Although sciences besides the study of sacred doctrine are subordinate to the Catholic faith, this in no way relegates them. Pope Pius IX and Pope Pius X were very pro-science; they saw how the errors of modernism not only threatened the Catholic faith but also threatened true science, too. They condemned these two propositions, respectively: Catholicism is compatible with modern civilization (Syllabus of Errors, 80.) and Catholicism is incompatible with true science (Lamentabili Sane, 65.); hence, modern civilization and true science are incompatible. But why are modern civilization and true science incompatible? Firstly, modern civilization is opposed to the Church. The huge popularity of anti-Catholic entertainment attests to this:
Is there anything science can't do? Evidently not. Here is Brown at his wackiest (p. 658): "Science has come to save us from our sickness, hunger, and pain! Behold science-the new God of endless miracles, omnipotent and benevolent! Ignore the weapons and the chaos." It's even an elixir for personal problems: "Forget the fractured loneliness and endless peril. Science is here!" The fact is that Catholicism promoted science & astronomy: Science would not have progressed as it has. "For the last fifty years," says professor Thomas E. Woods, Jr., "virtually all historians of science...have concluded that the Scientific Revolution was indebted to the Church." Sociologist Rodney Stark argues that the reason why science arose in Europe, and nowhere else, is because of Catholicism. "It is instructive that China, Islam, India, ancient Greece, and Rome all had a highly developed alchemy. But only in Europe did alchemy develop into chemistry. By the same token, many societies developed elaborate systems of astrology, but only in Europe did astrology lead to astronomy". The Catholic role in pioneering astronomy is not questioned. J.L. Heilborn of the University of California at Berkeley writes that "The Roman Catholic Church gave more financial aid and social support to the study of astronomy for over six centuries, from the recovery of ancient learning during the late Middle Ages into the Enlightenment than any other, and, probably, all other institutions." The Jesuits scientific achievements alone, reached every corner of the earth. What was it about Catholicism that made it so science-friendly, and why did science take root in Europe and not some place else? Stark knows why: "Because Christianity depicted God as a rational, responsive, dependable, and omnipotent being, and the universe as his personal creation. The natural world was thus understood to have a rational, lawful, stable structure, waiting (indeed, inviting) human comprehension."

Joseph Dias

Secondly, many believe modern science is more universal than the Church and try to arrive at a purer religion that everyone, regardless of their beliefs, can understand and accept. Pope Pius X condemns this as "broad and liberal Protestantism" (Lamentabili Sane, 65.). Lastly, modern civilization asserts there is no absolute, objective truth and reality: relativism. Modernism and relativism are big issues impeding some from coming to the Catholic faith, as encyclicals like Pope St. Pius X's Pascendi Dominici Gregis and Pope Pius XII's Humani Generis show. The Berkeley philosopher John Searle proves very well, and solely in philosophical terms, the irrationality of relativism in his "Refutation of Relativism" paper. The argument basically runs thus: "You can't even state relativism without denying it." Resulting from relativism is the notion that all the world's religions can coexist, i.e., syncretism, which is atheistic. It assumes the gods of the various religions do not exist in reality because if they all did exist, and because there are contradictions between the gods of different religions, there would be a contradiction in reality. Consequently, there would not be one truth but chaos, contradicting half-truths, and irrationality. Reality, however, is sensible and rational; not only can the natural sciences attest to this, but so can the Catholic faith, too. Read, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI's Epiphany '09 homily and his philosophy of mathematics. If there is no absolute truth or one single God governing the universe, then all religions' gods are only figments of their individual adherents' imaginations. That gods are whatever one wants them to be is Luther's Protestant idea that everyone is his own authority or even his own god, i.e., sola fide or "faith only" in any god(s). This is why Pope Pius X condems "broad and liberal Protestantism" in Lamentabili Sane. In summary, only with an increase of virtue and morals in today's civilization, resulting from a return to the Catholic Church, can true science progress.